

LETTERS
TO
WILLIAM PALEY, M.A. &
ARCHDEACON OF CARLISLE,
ON HIS
OBJECTIONS TO A REFORM
IN THE
REPRESENTATION OF THE COMMONS,
AND ON HIS APOLOGY FOR THE
INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN IN PARLIAMENT;
BEING
STRICTURES ON THE ESSAY UPON THE BRITISH
CONSTITUTION INTRODUCED IN HIS PRINCIPLES
OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY;
WITH
AN APPENDIX.

"Nullæ sunt occultiores insidiæ, quam eæ, quæ latent in SIMULA-
"TIONE OFFICII, aut in aliquo necessitudinis nomine: nam
"eum, qui palam est adversarius facile cavendo vitare possis, hoc
"vero occultum, *intestinum ac domesticum malum*, non modo non
"existit, verum-etiam opprimit, antequam perspicere atque ex-
"plorare potueris."

CICERO in *Verrem*.

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PREFATORY ADVERTISEMENT.

THE conjuncture of the times induced me to revize and to amplify some cursory strictures on the seventh Chapter of the sixth Book of THE PRINCIPLES OF MORAL AND POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY; which, when this work fell in my way some years ago, I sent to a periodical miscellany.—However frequent the practice, a moment's reflection would teach, that it cannot be the interest of any one engaged in a controversy to depreciate the powers of his adversary; for where is the utility of a contest with debility? or what can be the credit of a victory? Yet in the present instance I cannot forbear to observe, that if I were required to describe the impression this Gentleman's political labours left on the mind of others from their effect on my own, certainly I should apply the distich of the Poet—

“ This is mere moral babble, and direct

“ Against the canon laws of our foundation ;”——

and drop all further remark. Of course, for a long time I thought a formal answer to this production would be needless. But after having heard Mr. PALEY's name and work quoted in Westminster Hall and in Parliament, as of high authority—now that, I understand, it is appointed a standing book for examination in one of our Universities—and when I see the TENTH edition advertized, beside a separate publication of this obnoxious Chapter, I must take his performance to be worthy an investigation somewhat more detailed.

The

The general cast of these elementary disquisitions on political topics furnishes matter for speculation. After the example of the writers employed by the STUARTS, he has recourse to the patriarchal scheme for the origin of civil Government. We find the original Compact, maintained by LOCKE to exist between the King and the People, denied and controverted. There is a defence of the rotten Boroughs. He extenuates, in fact justifies, the Influence of the Crown on Parliament; and the volume closes with an enumeration of the advantages of a standing Army of mercenaries! I will not however accuse Mr. PALEY of any oblique motives in having blended with discourses on the social duties of Man, excuses for a system of disguised venality. But no one can absolve him from the reproach of countenancing practices which, so far from having foundation or warrant in the popular genius of our Government, cannot be carried on but in direct defiance of the Law of the land relative to the mode of constituting that Parliament, for which, during their Session, the Archdeacon of CARLISLE is enjoined to put up his prayer to Heaven "to direct and " prosper all their consultations—that Peace and Happiness, " Truth and Justice, Religion and Piety, may be established " among us."—

If any where in the ensuing sheets, I have expressed myself warmly, let it be remembered that I am repelling an attack on received opinions of constitutional Rights—an attack on Rights which I trust Englishmen will never cease to uphold.

In conclusion—should I at all assist to give a proper direction to the spirit of general discontent, which possesses some minds, or to dispel the illusion of panic-alarm at a Parliamentary Reform, which clouds the judgment of many, many more, this amusement of the leisure of the summer-months will not have been vain.

November 6.

LETTERS

to

WILLIAM PALEY, M. A.

ARCHDEACON OF CARLISLE

LETTER I.

" Però è bisogno, a voler pigliare autorità in una Repubblica,
" e mettervi trista forma, trovare la materia disordinata dal tem-
" po, e che a poco a poco, e di generazione in generazione, si sia
" condotta al disordine; la quale vi si conduce di necessità, quan-
" do la non sia (come di sopra si discorse) spesso rinfrescata di
" buoni esempi, o con nuove leggi ritirata verso i principj
" suoi."

MACCHIAVELLI, *Disc. sopra Livio, Lib. 3. Cap. 8.*

" He who would alter a Government, and set up himself,
" must attend till time hath corrupted the mass, and, by de-
" grees, brought all into disorder; which of necessity must
" follow, when it is not (as we said before) purged and refined
" by the examples of good men or good laws, that may reduce
" it toward its first principles."

Transf. 1720. fol. p. 393.

SIR,

ESSAYS on "*Moral Philosophy*" come in a very
questionable shape, when subservient to a defence
of the depravities of our Constitution. Look back,
and you will find those to have been the brightest
ornaments of the Church of England who tampered
the least with politics. Heretofore the friends of

B

Liberty

Liberty had to contend with formidable enemies, intrenched in the strong holds of superstition, and many brave men fell before the pulpit-batteries of *divine right* and *passive obedience* were silenced. At this day, we smile to see the sworn foes to the Rights of Mankind, when driven from those intrenchments, reduced to sculk behind the flimzey *mantelets* of Morality to discharge their feeble artillery.

We have all heard innumerable encomiums on the excellency of the English Constitution of State. Yours, however, Mr. PALEY, far, very far, surpasses every other. It is an hyperbole of panegyric. The whole scope of your reasoning is to convince us that our form of Government is contrived so admirably, that incroachments and perversions, combined with "*flagrant incongruities*," greatly contribute to its practical advantages! So the value of an antique statue advances in the eyes of some fantastic virtuosi in proportion to the mutilations it has suffered from the hand of violence, or the injuries of time.

As your preparatory sketch of what (with no slight violence to language) you call the "*popular Representation*," though by no means overcharged, is tolerably faithful, it is unnecessary to adjust the grounds of our controversy. According to you, "the House of Commons consists of five hundred and forty [fifty] eight Members, of whom *two hundred* are elected by *seven thousand* Constituents! so that a majority of these seven thousand, without any reasonable title to superior weight and influence
" in

“ in the State, may, under certain circumstances
 “ decide a question *against the opinion of as many mil-*
 “ *lions.* Or, to place the same object in another
 “ point of view—if my estate be situated in one
 “ county of the kingdom, I possess the ten thou-
 “ sandth part of a single Representative; if in an-
 “ other the thousandth; if in a particular district,
 “ I may be one in twenty who choose two Repre-
 “ sentatives; if in a still more favoured spot, I
 “ may enjoy the right of appointing two myself;
 “ if I have been born, or dwell, or have served an
 “ apprenticeship in one town, I am represented in
 “ the National Assembly by two Deputies, in the
 “ choice of whom I exercise an actual and sensible
 “ share of power: if accident has thrown my birth,
 “ or habitation, or service, into another town, I
 “ have no Representative at all, *nor any more power*
 “ *or concern in the Election of those who make the laws*
 “ *by which I am governed, than if I was a subject of*
 “ *the Grand Seigneur*—and this partiality subsists with-
 “ out any pretence whatever of merit or public pro-
 “ priety to justify the preference of one place to
 “ another. Or, thirdly, to describe the state of na-
 “ tional Representation as it exists in reality: it may
 “ be affirmed, I believe with truth, that about one
 “ half of the House of Commons obtain their Seats
 “ in that assembly by the Election of the People,
 “ *the other half by purchase, or the nomination of single*
 “ *proprietors of great estates.*”—P. 485. 4to. 1st edit.

Ab! Tantamne rem tam negligenter agere—To bur-
 lesque Representation, as well by withholding the

transcendent franchise of Election from numbers, whose qualifications give them a claim that cannot be resisted *by argument*, as by bestowing it on others, who, to use the softest terms, can have no pretension to exclusive preference. After your statement, contradictory to all those ideas of an House of Commons which we have received from writers the most accredited, many will feel it difficult to suspend their judgment against its competency. Instead of conciliating us to this contracted measure of anomalous Representation, perhaps your account of its actual construction will be thought to supersede all necessity of argument in favour of spreading an uniform and comprehensive right of Suffrage over the mass of the People. Waving all other considerations, it cannot but rush forcefully into the minds of most, that since Public Opinion ultimately upholds all Governments, to remove this palpable opprobrium ought to be the first care with every one rationally attached to the English Constitution. I say the first care, because it is easy to foresee that the odium of *such* defects in one will unjustly be transferred to all its branches. But, whatever may be the conceptions of others it is now my province to discuss the question with you. It is a question in which all have a common concern; for it is this—Has our Legislature acted rightly in rejecting the reiterated applications to rectify this medley of arbitrary inequality?

You sum up the gross amount of the corruptions in our Representation by affirming, that “*about ONE*

HALF

"HALF of the House of Commons obtain their seats by
 "PURCHASE, or the NOMINATION of single pro-
 "prietors of great estates." Ought not this por-
 tentous truth to arouse every Englishman? If
 choice and "purchase" be not the same, then
 they who buy their admission into the grand Repre-
 sentative Council of the Nation, can wear no colour
 of resemblance to those who heretofore received an
 allowance from their Constituents for their attend-
 ance. And that "nomination" can never compen-
 sate the loss of free election, appears to my mind as
 intuitively clear as that neither Representation nor
 its benefits can subsist when a legislative body is not
 derived from popular appointment. Figure to your-
 self my surprise at your unqualified assertion, that
 "the effect of all reasoning on the subject is to diminish
 "the first impression!"

Where chicanery is not on the watch to elude,
 nor venality at work to canker, time alone will give
 birth to many deviations in the best formed institu-
 tions. The Land-tax, though adjusted toward the
 close of the last century by a new assessment, has
 been for years grossly disproportionate; so as in
 many parts oppressively to bear on the land-owner;
 in others it is no more than nominal. What won-
 der, then, that the Commons' House of Parliament,
 a fortuitous assembly of which, in the darkness of
 its antiquity, the origin is not to be traced with
 certainty, should be fallen into disorder, and the
 elective powers require to be distributed afresh?
 The wisest systems, from the mutations of things,

in a tract of years, must be brought back to their fundamental principles, else they will mar the very purposes they were appointed to maintain. "The shadow serves the substance to invade." An adequate and free Representation of the People, suited to the existing state of society, is the life-spring and master-principle of freedom in our Constitution, [App. A.] and was most assuredly the foundation of parliamentary meetings. But the forms of constituting our Representatives have receded from the primary design so far that they have become absurd, and threaten to be destructive. What happens to all other human establishments, when the same course runs on for centuries, has happened to the House of Commons. In some Boroughs the Members exceed the number of Electors. Such are the Boroughs belonging to "*single proprietors*." Is not this annihilation of the leading idea of Representation glaringly *absurd*? And when the emissary of a *Tartar Mahometan* Prince has purchased not less than EIGHT SEATS among the Commons of Great BRITAIN in Parliament assembled, which was the case after the dissolution in 1780, it is an alarming abuse that may too justly be called *destructive*.*

In a division on the question, whether we should enjoy the blessings of Peace, or persevere in a disastrous and civil War, the NABOB OF ARCOT has borne equal weight with the county of MIDDLESEX,

* Among others Mr. PITT and Mr. BURKE authenticate this astonishing fact. See App. B,

and the cities of LONDON and WESTMINSTER!—Are there terms of sufficient strength to delineate this dreadful enormity in fit colours? What but a reformed plan of Elections can shield us from a repetition of these attacks, which strike at our existence as an independent State? The same inlet through which the rupees of MAHOMED ALI KHAN insinuated his agents into *Saint Stephen's Chapel*, you must confess to remain open; and, if your arguments be valid, ought not to be shut against intruders from any European power.

But you caution us to “be assured before we adventure upon a reformation, that the magnitude of the evil justifies the *danger* of the experiment.” The happy success in the sixteenth century of the Reformation in Religion, and of the Revolution in Monarchy in the last, events incomparably more replete with seeming “*danger*” than any abolition of the depopulated and venal Boroughs, demonstrate that any alterations either in Church or State, which the majority of the Nation approves, are not really dangerous. Or were they to appearance involved in “*danger*,” Englishmen, I trust, would exclaim with the spirit of the gallant Roman, better an hazardous freedom than the dead repose of servitude*.

To speak from “*experiment*,” the right of voting in CRICKLADE and in SHOREHAM has been amended in the present reign, by summoning the Free-

* “Potior visa est periculosa Libertas, quieto servitio.”

holders of the circumjacent Hundreds to their poll-booths. Not a whisper of complaint has been heard against this procedure; and it would perplex the most acute speculator to make out that the slightest appearance of "*danger*" could possibly arise from any well-weighed method of diluting a poison in the body-politic—A virulent poison, which already deeply corrodes its vitals, and if not soon corrected, will inevitably destroy the whole.

Yours is the blindness, not the fidelity of friendship. In truth the "*danger*" lies on the other side. There is "*danger*," great and, it may be, imminent "*danger*" in the rulers of a Nation hearing the call for Reforms with averted ears. That stubborn selfishness which relies on the strong arm of power to bear out its hateful usurpations, may indeed endanger the peace and happiness of a country. If salutary truths be scorned on the one side, extravagant projects will be indulged on the other. Instances are not wanting to show to you, that planting despair or disgust in the hearts of those who seek to ward off a national convulsion by seasonable and temperate Reformation, impels inconsiderate and ardent tempers to follow their object at whatever risk: while milder dispositions, desponding, or shrinking from the threatened shock, leave indignant enthusiasts to urge on the general dissatisfaction, which conduct so insensate never fails to provoke. But the affections of the human mind must be inverted before concession irritate, or before a redress of public grievances excite public discontent. I pursue "the wisdom of
" a timely

" a timely Reform" no further in my own words,
 and now lay before you a canonical text, which I wish
 to see blazoned in golden letters on the walls of both
 Houses of Parliament.—" Early Reformations are
 " amicable arrangements with a friend in power : late
 " Reformations are terms imposed upon a conquered
 " enemy ; early Reformations are made in cool
 " blood ; late Reformations are made under a state
 " of inflammation. In that state of things the Peo-
 " ple behold in Government nothing that is re-
 " spectable. They see the abuse, and they will see
 " nothing else.—They fall into the temper of a
 " furious populace provoked at *the disorder of a house*
 " *of ill fame* ; they never attempt to correct or regu-
 " late ; they go to work by the shortest way—they
 " abate the nuisance, *they pull down the house* *."—
 So much for your caution on "*the danger of the ex-*
 "*periment.*"

I am now to obviate an argument of some plau-
 sibility. You consider Representation " so far only
 " as a right as it contributes to the establishment of
 " good Laws, or secures their just administration.
 " These effects (say you, and truly) depend upon
 " the *disposition* and abilities of the national coun-
 " sellors. Wherefore, *if* men (you add) the most
 " likely by their qualifications to know and to pro-
 " mote the public interest be actually returned to
 " Parliament, *it signifies little who return them. If*
 " the properest persons be elected, *what matters it*

* BURKE ; Speech on his Reform-Bill. Works, v. 2. p. 189.

“ *by whom they are elected?* At least no prudent
 “ statesman would subvert *long established or even set-*
 “ *tled rules* of Representation, without a prospect of
 “ procuring wiser or better Representatives.”—P.
 487. *Much virtue in Touchstone’s* IF, Mr. PALEY.
 Permit me to avail myself, *à converso*, of this useful
 particle. *If* men the most unlikely, by their want of
 “ *qualifications to know and to promote the public in-*
 “ *terest, be actually returned to Parliament,*” which
 unquestionably *has* happened in former, and there-
 fore *may* in future Parliaments, it signifies much that
 the mode be altered—*If* many the most improper
 have ever been elected, through the blind and pre-
 posterous allotment of the powers of Election—
If ever “ *the rotten part of our Constitution, the*
 “ *small Boroughs,* (the strong language of BUR-
 “ NET) have been wrought on to choose bad men.”
 [App. C.]—*If* the needy and the worthless, raw
 lads, and spendthrifts*, gamblers and usurers, have
 not seldom disparaged the House—*If* the Stewards,
 or Sons, or younger Brothers of Peers, Officers,
 naval and military, practising Lawyers and Pension-
 ers, Commissaries and Loan-jobbers, have frequently
 gotten Seats, is it not a matter of the most mo-
 mentous urgency that the modes of exercising the
 elective franchise should undergo a revision? Are
 such “ *men the most likely*” to sustain the dignified
 character, and to fulfil the duties of elected Legis-
 lators? In no other department of the State are

* “ And if a Borough choose him, not undone.”—Pope.

persons employed in posts for which they are so obviously unfit. See, Sir, to estimate the value of the present system of Election by your own standard, the characters of many "*actually returned to Parliament*," establishes that there must be an inherent vice in the structure of that body!

Set it in the strongest light. Let it be even conceded for the moment, that the identical men would be "*returned to Parliament*" by gratuitous and free Elections, who now steal in thither by "*purchase or nomination*." A teacher of Morals ought to have known how much the human character is affected by circumstances. Till you had gravely stated, that "*if the properest persons be elected, by whom*" is of little importance, the question would not have borne a doubt, whether the "*disposition*" of the same man deriving his political existence from public favour to bear the faculties of this great office profitably to the People—is to be assimilated to his "*disposition*" when he seats himself by a draft on his banker, How! Is the sense of obligation nothing? Are the popular habitudes and talents which recommend a Candidate in popular Elections, nothing? * Is it nothing to reciprocate good offices? Is it nothing

* "A strenuous resistance to every appearance of lawless power; a spirit of independence carried to some degree of enthusiasm; an inquisitive character to discover, and a bold one to display, every corruption and every error of Government; these are the qualities which recommend a man to a Seat in the House of Commons in open and merely popular Elections."—BURKE; *Thoughts on the present Discontents.*

that

that we can continue him in the station as long as we approve, and can cast him off when we approve no longer? You overlook that elevation by Suffrage not only increases the probability of personal excellence, but induces an aptitude to minister to the wants, and a wish to accommodate the expectations of the People. Hence the certain "*prospect*" "*of procuring wiser and better Representatives*" by a well-proportioned scale of Election.

Fallacy lives on generalities; and you deal largely in them. I shall particularize my observations on practices so distant as our rights of voting from the dictates of common sense. If indeed no adventitious qualities be impressed on the minds of the Legislators for the Commons, by the description of those who vest in them that trust, it "*matters not by whom they are elected.*" But you cannot suppose the "*Deputies*" certified by a dozen or two of workmen in the dock-yard at QUEENBOROUGH, or by the nominal proprietors of drowned land at ST. MAWES, to be votaries to the public good, are as likely "to protect in the Legislature the rights of the Republic of Letters," as the Members for our Universities. In another place, "*the variety of tenures and qualifications, upon which the right of voting is founded, appears to you a recommendation of the mode which now subsists, as it tends to introduce into Parliament a corresponding mixture of characters and professions,*" p. 489. So then you cannot be quite clear that the provincial Representatives have the same feelings for Commerce as the Gentlemen chosen
by

by the sea-port Towns ; and if not quite clear that the Members for LIVERPOOL and BRISTOL, and the Members for the midland Counties, are equally alive to mercantile interests, how can you be clear that the "*half of the House who obtain their Seats by purchase or nomination,*" and the half "*elected by the People,*" will alike consider *their* cause and interest as their own ?

It is not, it is not in the nature of things that the spurious Elections of the Family or Treasury Boroughs, should answer the purposes of legitimate Representation. The very essence of Representation is gone in him who holds his Seat independent of the Country. What is Representation, or its use, if it be not to obtain Legislators who, feeling the same interests, will breathe the same inclinations and the same aversions ? The Members who proceed from the People are covenanted to take their bent from the People. I ask you, what engagement Legislators on surreptitious Elections have in common with those who are in by real deputation ? In the mercenary and *pocket* Boroughs, in BARNSTAPLE or MIDHURST, where is the control of the Constituents ?—to whom the responsibility of their Members ? Attentive to private advantage, these pseudo-Representatives, disregarding their distant and dubious relation to the People, will use their powers as Legislators to advance their interests as individuals, at the public expence. On the contrary, preserve the free exercise of the Voters' wills, which would be done by extending, in all cases, the right of Suffrage

frage to such numbers, that bribery, or any indirect interposition, could be of no avail; shorten at the same time very considerably the term of the trust, and the consequent and perpetual connexion between the Delegate and his Constituents must preclude sinister conduct.

“*If men*” in every respect as well “*qualified*” were returned when the elective act is lodged in a standing body of thirty, as it is at BATH and EDINBURGH, as if it were devolved on the Inhabitant-Householders—a fluctuating, more numerous, and from these causes no doubt a purer elective assembly—all that I should object would be, that the *Corporation* enjoyed what belonged to the *Town*. But where is the man frontless enough to say that Members for Corporate Bodies of the class of CHRISTCHURCH or of HARWICH have been, except in matters of Taxation, renowned for their labours of legislative patriotism?—Plain men have thought that the infallible way to procure the Election of “*the properest persons*,” would be so to regulate Elections, that merit should be the sole motive of choice; because when open to venal applications we may confidently predict the success of a Candidate with no other qualification than the gold in his hand, against an opponent gifted with every quality to win on the heart.—“*If the properest persons were elected*,” I would not contend with you that it was of very high moment “*by whom*” they were chosen. Unhappily a reference to the Return-book destroys your assertion. Search the successive lists of the House of Commons—you will soon find that the
hereditary

hereditary depravity of HINDON and STOCKBRIDGE has not fixed on men quite so eminent for probity and public services as YORK and WESTMINSTER.—Does any one who has not renounced the use of reason associate to the Burgeſſes of WEOBLY or LUDGERSHALL, the ſame ideas of confidence as to the Repreſentors of SURREY or NORFOLK? Or could the public hope of fidelity to the principles of a delegated truſt, reſoſe as rationally on the Gentlemen who ſit for the Weſtern Boroughs as on the County-Members? I ſhall believe the ſame propenſity to exiſt in the latter to hold themſelves releaſed from the obligations of Repreſentatives of the People as in the former, when I believe the ſame ſpirit animates the breaſts of the Kentiſh Yeoman and of the clerical candidate for preferment. In fine, is it (I muſt repeat) a thing to be credited, that the general intereſt is not more in danger to be ſacrificed to private ends where this exalted ſituation in the State is acquired by men whom the People neither love nor would have truſted, than when given by public affection—a proud diſtinction, the honorary reward and the proof of ſuperior merit?

On the cogency of this hypothetical argument you ſeem to place your main reliance. That it may perplex no one, I will ſift it thoroughly; and now let me put it to you in another way. The moſt pertinacious oppoſer of a Parliamentary Reform will not hazard the aſſertion that the aſſembly acting in the name and on the behalf of the Commonalty of theſe united Kingdoms, if wholly delegated by the un-

bribed

bribed and unbiaſſed Suffrages of the People would conſiſt of men with the ſame ſentiments and purſuits as it now does. I know not whether in your zeal for the Borough-mongers you will deny the unavoidable inference—that the ſelfiſh deſigns of thoſe who procure Seats clandestinely muſt of neceſſity differ ſo widely from their views who are ſelected by Electors in fact *worthy and independent*, that who ſees not diſtinctly the Vote of the one, muſt on many important queſtions be diametrically oppoſite to what would be the determination of the other?

Perhaps it will be deemed ſuperfluous to continue this line of argument further. But you ſhall have “ a corollary rather than want.” I reſt it on the common ſenſe of mankind whether we can form as ſure a judgement of the collective will of the County of WILTS from the Votes of the ſubſtitutes of the noble Proprietor of OLD SARUM, as from thoſe of the Knights of that Shire? And whether experience decide that the former, diſcarding individual intereſt, “ *know and promote the intereſt*” of this County as attentively as the latter? In other words, would you inſult the aſhes of SAWBRIDGE and SAVILE by a comparison with *** or with ****— Can you degrade the Liverymen of LONDON and the Freeholders of YORKSHIRE to a level with the Potwallopers of SHAFTESBURY and the Burgagors of PETERSFIELD? Now, as far as other component parts partake of the ſame faults, the aggregate muſt be faulty, at leaſt in a commenſurate degree: as the collective worth of our “ *National Representation*” can
reſult

result only from the personal worth of the individuals who compose it. The aggregate must in exact proportion, if not in a compound ratio, fail to be an organ to collect the public sentiment, and to insure the end and aim of Representation—an *Identity of Interest* between the People and their appropriate branch of the Legislature. Attend to the inference to be deduced from this inquiry. It is, that whether we survey this mass in the gross, or single out determinate objects, we alike discern that the character (and by consequence the qualifications and the conduct) of the *Elected*, depends on the character, because on that circumstance depends the choice of the *Electors*. For the future, then, you will not rashly pronounce that “*it signifies little who return the “national counsellors” intrusted to “promote the public “interest” by enacting Laws to bind the Lives and Birthrights of the People of Britain.*”

It would have surprised me, if the antiquity of the multifarious rights of voting at Parliamentary Elections had not found a place among your objections to their correction. Be any custom repugnant to reason, or bent from its first direction, if but old, it will always find defenders. So prone is the human mind to resist change. No sooner is it proposed to rectify an obsolete absurdity or an immemorial abuse, than the Reformers are sure to be conjured not to innovate with new-fangled refinements the provisions of antient prudence. Then are we stunned with the bawling of all who are willing to blunder on from generation to generation in error, provided the error

be prescriptive. Away with this common-place. Our ancestors did much for us: but no (not your) antipathy to Reform will say *in positive terms*, they left us nothing to do.

Sir, be assured I bear due respect to "*long established, or even settled rules.*" The difference between us is this—I declare for antient principles—You are tenacious of old forms; because I admire the theory of the Constitution, and you approve the practice.—I venerate the age of Parliament, but would transfuse into its debilitated frame a fresh portion of the bloom and vigour of youth. You dote on superannuated imbecility, and are enamoured with grey hairs and wrinkles which you fondly fancy it would disfigure the beauty of the Constitution to remove.—I mean not to deny that every well-wisher to Parliamentary melioration has to regret the departure from many good old "*rules,*" and the substitution of their reverse. For instance, it was the wholesome usage of former times, to recur to what I have mentioned already, for the Delegates to be paid by those who sent them a pecuniary remuneration for their labours in Parliament. This "*rule*" has been turned quite round. Without looking out of your work we find it has grown up into an avowed practice for numbers "*to purchase their Seats,*" and Wages, at least from their Constituents, since the days of MARVEL have been received by none of the Members.—Of old this was the answer of the Commons "*when any new device is moved on the King's behalf in Parliament, that they dare not*"
agree

“ agree without conference with their Countries.” *
 This answer has sunk into disuse—so long sunk into disuse that many Members spurn at the idea of obedience to Instructions.—In derogation of popular rights, we continue to summon *four* Burgesses from a decayed hamlet, like EAST LOOE and WEST LOOE, while we suffer Towns risen to the repute of MANCHESTER and SHEFFIELD to be destitute of a voice in Parliament. But in Parliaments that are passed, as Towns increased in “ trade and grew populous “ they were admitted to a share in the Legisla- “ ture.”—BLACKST. *Com. v. 1. p. 174. 8vo.* On the same reason, CALAIS when annexed to the Crown of England sent Burgesses to Westminster †.— Thus highly the principle was in better days respected of assigning separate agents in Legislation to districts intitled to them by their importance. We congratulate ourselves on the superior diffusion of political knowledge in our own age, yet we leave the choice of Legislators with beggary and ruins, and re-

* Sir Edw. COKE. 4 Inst. 11.—“ Many in all ages, and some-
 “ times the whole body of the Commons have refused to give
 “ their opinion in some cases, till they had consulted with those
 “ who sent them: The Houses have bin often adjourned to
 “ give them time to do it; and if this were done more fre-
 “ quently, or that the Towns, Citys, and Countys, had on some
 “ occasions given Instructions to their Deputys, matters would
 “ probably have gone better in Parliament than they have often
 “ done.”—SIDNEY; *Disc. concerning Government, ch. 3. sect. 38.*

† WHITELOCKE'S *Notes upon the King's Writt for choosing Members of Parlelament. 2. 359.*

fuse this high franchise to wealth and population !
 A twofold violation of antient principle. For it is
 not only that the sorry place WEYMOUTH stands on
 the same footing in our Parliamentary councils with
 the Counties of KENT and ESSEX—not merely that
 the names of deserted villages, have never been
 erased from the rolls of Parliament, of which the
 Reformers complain. They are further shocked by
 the joint-existence of contradictory abuses—by the
 actual presence in the Parliament-House of Members
 for NEWTOWN and GATTON, as well as by the non-
 Representation of such flourishing Towns as LEEDS
 and BIRMINGHAM.—The time has been that *Sessional*,
 not as now septennial Parliaments, were a “ *settled* ”
 “ *rule.* ” That none who were not inhabitants of the
 place were eligible was another “ *early rule,* ” and
 “ *established* ” by positive Statutes. Now, not only
 Electors are non-resident, but a Member may be
 ignorant of the County where the corn-fields lie for
 which he *serves* in Parliament. “ In the olden time ”
 before us, the Exchequer had no character to denote
 a million of money, and Aids and Subsidies were
 wrung with reluctant murmurs from the parsimonious
 Commons. We have lived to see and to feel millions
 and tens of millions voted in one Session, and without
 the formality of a Division. There was too another
 maxim which we should do well to revive. When
 money was taken from our forefathers, they felt some
 alleviation of their additional burthens in so far as it
 was a Custom of Parliament that a redress of Griev-
 ances and a grant of Supplies “ went hand in hand. ”

To

To every Money-bill was tacked some Bill favourable to the People *. Of late, accessions of Influence have been their only remuneration. It is now their misfortune that every increase of Taxation necessarily swells the Influence of the Crown, while it lessens the security of the Subject by adding to the numbers, and by enlarging the powers, of Revenue Officers.

To return (if it can be said I have digressed), as you resort to the stale cant, of respect for customs, because handed down to us from high antiquity, I must remind you that since Borough-speculations have proved so gainful, your "*long established and settled rules*" are daily and notoriously narrowed, or distorted, or frustrated. Thus, among many other evasions, often where the Corporators monopolize the franchise of Election, he who once obtains the ruling interest does not supply vacancies till the Corporation, reduced as at MARLBOROUGH, and BUCKINGHAM, to a handful, is to be easily managed: then of course they are filled up with his own dependents only, nominating one another in perpetual succession. Hence very many of these public Magistracies, of late years, have dwindled into the appendage of a private family. Can you say that these *close* Boroughs have not departed from

* " It hath ever been the Custom of Parliaments, by good and wholesome Laws to refresh the Commonwealth in general; yea, and to descend into the remedies of particular Grievances, before any mention made of a Supply."—WALLER; *Works*, p. 400. 4to.

the meaning of their Grant?—Or that these bodies originally incorporated for purposes beneficial to the community, but now rankly misused, ought not to be disfranchized, and the Election thrown open, as the constitutional principle of free and popular Election demands? [App. D.] For my part, I readily profess my inability to discover wherein the difference to the independency of the Representatives of the People consists, between garbling the Charters of Parliamentary Corporations, as our second JAMES attempted, and defeating their intent by these illusory artifices.—No less exceptionable is the practice in the Burgage-tenure Boroughs, where the right of voting is now holden to be an incident inseparable from certain spots of ground, from the sites of hovels—from “deserted shambles, or a gravel-pit*! These, formerly in various hands, have been bought up by some wealthy individual, who satisfies the forms and circumstances of an Election by polling his *parchment*-Voters before the ink of their Conveyance be well dry.—He must indeed be possessed with a mechanical habit of admiring antiquated usages, who knowing that to send Representatives was originally deemed a *Service*, now hears this common and political right treated as a special *Privilege*, and as vendible *Property*, yet writes about adhering to “*long established and settled rules.*”

Talk no more, Sir, of “*long established and settled rules.*” It is idle, unless you were able to dis-

* See the DOWNTON-CASE; 1 Luder's Rep. of Election-Committees, 162.

prove the taunt of the Foreigner *, were he to address you after this manner—‘ Your Law vaunts
 ‘ that Englishmen act in Legislation “ either in person, or by Representation upon their own free
 ‘ Elections.” [App. E.] ‘ Annul this declaration
 ‘ which now stands on your Statute-Book only to
 ‘ reproach you. Why the very inhabitants of one
 ‘ of the suburbs of London (the *Tower Ham-*
 ‘ *lets*), even presuming against the fact, that none
 ‘ of your Elections were supposititious, outnumber
 ‘ the Constituents of a Majority of your lower
 ‘ House of Legislature. [App. F.] The vocabulary
 ‘ of contempt (he might presume to add) furnishes
 ‘ no name to stigmatize the supine indifference of
 ‘ the English Nation to the barefaced market of the
 ‘ legislative office. When you cannot deny (he
 ‘ might tell us) that Perpetuities and Reversions of
 ‘ Seats, among your Representatives, are advertized
 ‘ for sale by auction as publicly as seats at your
 ‘ Theatres!’ [App. G.]

SUCH are the frauds on the Law; and such the innovations on the approved policy of our antient Constitution—by means of which a mob of Courtiers and self-existent Members, as well as shoals of the nominees of Peers, and of other “ *single pro-*

* “ On répète tous les jours dans les pays étrangers que le
 “ Peuple Anglois n’est point représenté comme il devoit
 “ l’être.”—“ Un des plus grands malheurs de l’Angleterre est
 “ en effet que sa Representation Parlementaire soit tres-inegale,
 “ & l’on peu ajouter, fort *intéressée à rester tres-inegale.*”—
 MIRABEAU.

"*prietors of great estates*," under an arrogated sanction, crowd into and pollute the House of the People. Representatives merely titular—How much, how infinitely more pernicious to the Liberties of England than if *John Doe* and *Richard Roe* had in such cases been the Return to the Sheriff's Precept of Election!

LETTER

LETTER II.

“ Could we suppose a Body-politic framed perfect in its first
 “ conception or institution, yet it must fall into decays, not
 “ only from the force of accidents, but even from the very
 “ rust of time; and at certain periods must be furbished up, or re-
 “ duced to its first principles, by the appearance and exercise of some
 “ great virtues, or some great severities.”

Sir W. TEMPLE; *Essay on Popular Discontents. Works, v. 1.*
p. 258. fol.

SIR,

I COME now to an objection against a Reform of the sophisticated Representation of this country, on which you seem to lay much stress—that no “ *new scheme promises to collect together more wisdom, or produce firmer integrity*” than that in use. If this position be true, your declamation on the necessity of *Influence* to carry forward the business of the Nation in Parliament, is pregnant with a melancholy reflection. I should be sorry to think selfish depravity to be so intimately moulded into the heart, that no modes of Election could “ *collect,*” throughout a population of perhaps ten millions, sufficient “ *wisdom and integrity,*” though interest do not clash with duty, to assent to the regulations requisite to the common welfare, unless *influenced* by private and mercenary motives. Holding a more favourable opinion of our fellow-citizens in particular, and of our fellow-men in general, I am persuaded that the
 mis-

mischief originates in those imperfections and consequent perversions of our Representative System which you admire and defend. Let us examine. You intreat us to consider duly that "we have a
 " House of Commons composed of five hundred
 " and *forty* [fifty] eight Members, in which number are to be found *the most considerable Landholders*
 " *and Merchants of the kingdom; the heads of the*
 " *Army, the Navy, and the Law: the occupiers of*
 " *great Offices in the State; together with many private individuals eminent by their knowledge, eloquence,*
 " *or activity.* Now if the country be not safe in
 " such hands, in whose may it confide its interests?
 " *If* such a number of such men be liable to the
 " influence of corrupt motives, what Assembly of
 " men will be secure from the same danger? *Does*
 " *any new scheme of Representation promise to collect together more wisdom, or produce firmer integrity?"*
 " In this view of the subject, and attending not to
 " ideas of abstract proportion and regularity (of
 " which many minds are much enamoured), *but to*
 " *EFFECTS alone*, we may discover just excuses for
 " those parts of the present Representation which
 " appear to a *hasty observer* most exceptionable and
 " absurd."—P. 488. As in this passage you seem, Sir, to more than insinuate that so long as men of these denominations be convened to debate on national affairs, it matters not whether they be called to that high office by the unsuborned voice of the People, or be named by a mandatory recommendation of the Crown or its Ministers, perhaps it would
 have

have been as well to have "*declined all conference*" with you. However, as this doctrine, wholly repugnant both to the letter and the reason of our limited form of Government, sounds as yet harsh and grating in the ear of an Englishman, it was incumbent on you first to prove, *that* the upper ranks of society are endowed with transcendent powers of intellect, superior acquirements, and more inflexible integrity, than lower stations: *That* honours and emoluments, hanging full in the sight of all who aim at the most exalted posts in "*the Army, the Navy, and the Law,*" do not too often dazzle them so much as to turn them aside from the path of rectitude, to gather some of those flowers and fruits in all seasons to be found in the purlieus of a Court: *That* he who is given a place of profit does not varnish his implicit submission to the dictates of his Patron by pleading, 'I must vote as directed; my politics may be wrong, but I cannot be wrong in my gratitude:' *That* the choice of the People is blind, falling on men notoriously defective in wisdom and virtue: *That* our forefathers, when with parental anxiety they strove by every preventive regulation which their foresight, in days of simplicity and truth, could devise to guard against all infringements of THE FREEDOM OF ELECTION, and to preserve the honesty of their Representatives when elected, proceeded on groundless apprehensions: *That* therefore, the Clause declaring that ELECTIONS OF MEMBERS OF PARLIAMENT OUGHT TO BE FREE, should be blotted from the BILL OF RIGHTS,

and at the same time every Act vacating the Seats of Placemen and Pensioners in some cases, in others disqualifying them for sitting in Parliament, should be torn from the Statute-book as injurious. Yes ! Sir, you must previously prove that rank and wealth announce talents, knowlege, and probity: *That* honours and emoluments are not insnaring: *That* personal obligations do not warp the mind from public duties: *That* the People are not competent to fix on proper guardians of their Liberty and Property: *That* the terrors of our ancestors being false, their precautions to secure the Freedom of Election, and the Independency of Members of Parliament were pernicious; and, by consequence, *that* every statutory provision to preserve the INTEGRITY OF PARLIAMENT should be holden to be a dead letter.—Meanwhile you ought not to expect any person to acquiesce in your train of reasoning, an Election-broker perhaps excepted.—Beside: Grant that “ *no new scheme of Representation promises to collect together more wisdom, or produce firmer integrity.*” Well; what is the conclusion from “ *this view of the question?*” Indisputably, that there would be no danger in appeasing the clamour of “ *the Reformers*” by gratifying their demands. Certainly, it escaped you that in putting this question you throw aside all fears that the cause of Corruption would sustain injury through the introduction of “ *more wisdom and integrity*” by equalized Elections.

Let me not be uncandid. Perhaps you did not wilfully pass sophistry on you readers. You might
be

be unaware that (with the single exception of Merchants) your imposing description of the Commons' House of Parliament holds equally true applied to the House of the Peers. That separate and permanent body comprizes your colourable criteria of the best "*scheme of collecting wisdom and integrity*" to regulate state-affairs. There too we have "*the most considerable Land-holders of the Kingdom, the heads of the Army, the Navy, and the Law, the occupiers of great Offices in the State, together with many private individuals eminent by their knowledge, eloquence, and activity.*"—Whatever may be the advantages derived to the mixed nature of our political system, by a titled and hereditary Order, as a patrician barrier to stand between the Crown and the Commons, yet no man, who deserves attention, will advance that it would be "*safe*" to resign "*the country into their hands,*" nor will recommend it to "*confide its interests*" solely to them. Most indisputably the English Constitution of Government abhors the supposition: otherwise it would not have instituted "*general Inquisitors of the Realm**," whom it presumes to receive their commission from the People to consult *circa ardua regni*—to assess their contributions to the State, to enact Laws, to audit the public disbursements, to advise the Crown, and to control or approve the acts of the Ministers of State. Thereby forbidding us to believe that "*such a number of such men*" as you are content to suppose adequate to all

* Sir Edw. COKE; 4 Inst. 11.

the ends of good Government are not "*liable to the influence of corrupt motives.*"—By your estimate, it should appear, that one who aspires to be a preceptor of "*Political Philosophy,*" is still to be taught that something more than large property, external eminence, and shining talents are requisite in an assembly of Legislators. These qualities will not, Sir, alone warrant you in contending that where they be found, that body is the best calculated to work out public happiness—Because these qualities do not necessarily involve an IDENTITY OF INTEREST between the *Governed* and their *Governors*.

History exhibits (and, so long as Self continues to be the general* and predominant impulse of action in Man, every volume will exhibit) abundant and indubitable evidence, that among Legislators not feeling a Community of Interest, all idea of a public trust will be lost in private considerations. Distinct from the People they invariably set up an interest distinct from the interests of the People. Where this one thing is wanting, men have no rational assurance that the virtue of their rulers will be proof against the allurements of power. A *Corporation-spirit* absorbs the character of a *National Committee*, and the public weal is sacrificed to the "pride of place," the peculations of avarice, and the lust of dominion.

This Identity of Interest is to be attained by a participation of the People in their own Govern-

* I say *general*. We see splendid exceptions which prove it not to be *universal*.

ment, [App. H.] and to be attained by that mode alone. For the People are solely and invariably actuated by this motive—the good of the whole. *They* can have no interest adverse or separate from general prosperity, and therefore never, never have conspired against it. But it is impracticable for all the individuals constituting a State of any extent of territory to express their will in person. Were it not so, promiscuous multitudes are fickle and turbulent; sometimes sluggish, and sometimes precipitate. On many accounts a concourse of assembled numbers is unfit to share immediately in the systematical and operose measures requisite in national proceedings. This was in former ages the grand *desideratum*—to contrive some orderly method of learning and digesting the sense of the People *. How to condense public virtue, and to consolidate the gathered wisdom of a nation, is the noble discovery of modern Europe in political science. Happily it is no longer problematical, that those functions which the People are unable to exercise by their special interposition they can perform *mediately*—by a *temporary* delegation of their authority to depositaries selected from and by themselves. The Assemblies of the Estates under the Feudal System unfolded, most probably by chance, that such a devolution of the popular will

* “To follow, not to force the public inclination; to give
“a direction, a form, a technical dress, and a specific sanction,
“to the general sense of the community, is the true end of
“Legislature.” BURKE; *Works*, v. 2. p. 136.

combines as great public spirit as animated the Democracies of Greece or the Roman Republic in their proudest æras with the order and stability of opinion necessary in Councils charged with the weighty business of empire. In a Legislature of which a just Representation of the People composes a constituent part, a real and most intimate connection is made to subsist between the Legislators and the subjects of their Legislation. Its Members assured, if they swerve from their duty, that they shall speedily be resolved into the common mass, and must on their return to private life individually bear an equal load of the grievances they should impose, their interest must be one and the same with that of their Constituents: Therefore it is that an House of Representatives is the only place where power may be securely reposed, and ought not to be dreaded. There it is formidable only to corruption and imposture. In a word; an Assembly thus identified with the People, by insuring as well frugality in the administration of national affairs as the equal blessings of Liberty, provides a safeguard that Law shall never lapse into oppression, nor Taxation be wound up into legalized rapine.

These are immutable tenets in the civil creed of our "*Parliamentary Reformers*," and imbibed from the Constitution of the Government under which they were born. It remains for me, Sir, to bring them home to our own "business and bosoms." There is no need again to have recourse to your *prospectus* of the corruptions in the Representation.

That

That may be done on higher authority. In the records of Parliament it is clearly articulated, and evidence tendered to verify the facts at the Bar, that “ *eighty-four* individuals do by their own immediate authority send *one hundred and fifty-seven* Members”—and that “ *one hundred and fifty* more are returned by the *recommendation* of *seventy* powerful individuals—making the total number of Patrons only *one hundred and fifty-four* who return in the whole THREE HUNDRED AND SEVEN.” [App. I.] A decisive Majority of the British House of Commons!!! More than this—the same Record empowers me to aver, that in ENGLAND and WALES, (exclusive of SCOTLAND) nearly a MILLION OF HOUSEHOLDERS, paying Taxes, have, as such, “ no voice in the Representation.”—“ Neither their contributions to the public burthens, their peaceable demeanour as good Subjects, nor their general respectability and merits as useful Citizens, afford them as the Law now stands, the smallest pretensions to participate in the choice of those who *under the name of their Representatives*, may dispose of their Fortunes and Liberties.” Or rather—for why do I vary your own emphatic illustration—every such non-electors may indeed complain—“ *I have no Representative at all, nor any more power or concern in the Election of those who make the Laws by which I am governed, THAN IF I WAS A SUBJECT OF THE GRAND SEIGNIOR.*”

When to these great and inherent defects in the frame of Parliament we couple its septennial dura-

D

tion,

tion, the Lower House, I fear, carries in its prominent features too many infallible tendencies toward an oligarchical and standing SENATE. [App. K.] To say no more, it is *not* a House of Commons, renewed by frequent Elections, wherein every man enjoying a visible pledge to society exercises the right of Suffrage. Where then (it may be asked) is the community of feeling requisite to breed that interest, one and indivisible, which forms the distinctive character of a House of Legislature truly representative? "For the foundation's lost of *common good**, " till that portion of their Representation, now purloined from the People, be retrieved. If these things have not almost destroyed its operation among us, here are obvious causes (say the friends of constitutional renovation) to conclude that its advantages must be lamentably diminished. And of what are they desirous?—Of innovations on ENGLISH ideas of Liberty? No: They adhere to the genuine characteristic of their own Constitution. Wherefore it is their reasonable prayer to be *remitted* to the antient right of the English Commons—a *Representative in full, FREE, frequent, and NEW Parliaments*. They crave no fanciful alterations. They propose not to abolish, but to restore and to improve; where to improve is to perpetuate. By repairing and widening the base, they would strengthen the edifice and perfect its symmetry. Full well they know our system contains within itself the power of correction by safe, regular

* Otway.

and legal means, and they demand no speculative nor extra-constitutional expedients. Obeying the precepts of BLACKSTONE, HUME, and many others—" *Hasty observers*" (you think) but surely zealous and *not ignorant* supporters of all the three Estates in our Constitution—the "*Reformers*" of Parliament seek to enlarge and to invigorate that branch of it, which from the incessant alterations in all human affairs, co-operating with an extensive change in manners, in the nature of property, super-added to various political circumstances, they conceive to be grown inefficient to its original uses.

You are now, perhaps for the first time, in full possession of the elevated grounds on which "the "*Reformers of England*" take their stand. Thence, you must discern their *end* is to banish all partial and selfish views from the mansion of Legislation, in order to make room for an inseparable "*society of interests.*" Their *mean* a fair Representation of the People in a House of Commons *purely elective*. In that hope, founded on these considerations, it is the wish of many to call the Masters of Families into political existence; a very numerous and the most respectable class in society, on whom the burthen of Government heavily and chiefly presses. This is the "*scheme*" they dare to "*promise will collect more wisdom,*" and, by creating a constant union of sympathy and sentiment between the Electoral and the Delegated Bodies, will, they are confident, "*produce firmer integrity.*"—When the happy day arrives that the one cannot be affected without producing

correspondent emotions in the other, the country will never again be driven to make its will known by the circuitous mode and uncertain issue of County-Meetings and general Associations—to set up the voice of the People against the Vote of the Legislature. We shall then be sure that no measure can be carried thro’ Parliament that will not be stamped with the corroborative sanction of national approbation.

Far different must it be while the Borough-holders occupy by sufferance the greater part of the House which of right belongs to the “*national Representatives.*” The same painful alternative, as in the American War, will continually recur so long as the same cause shall subsist. In this predicament the People have only to interpose their sense to the acts of the constituted power of the State, or to stand quiescent spectators of Ministers and their Majorities running the career to public ruin.

By this time, you perceive that no disgust at the maze in which the right of Parliamentary Suffrage is bewildered prompts those to whom I joined my petitionary voice in imploring Parliament to improve its own excellencies. Undoubtedly we wish to facilitate these intricacies; yet our minds are not led away by “*ideas of abstract proportion and regularity,*” as you suggest, previously to your appeal “*to effects alone.*” All enumeration of the “*effects*” on which you so boldly rely, you have most unaccountably omitted. However, we gladly accept your challenge, and rejoin that roused by “*effects*” to the investigation

vestigation of causes, before we propounded remedies we traced the grievances we labour under up to the objects of our Reform. The motives that impel us are manifold. But not to take too wide a range, I will confine myself to two points.—The enjoyment as well of personal Freedom as of Property is the paramount principle of the social order. The security of the one, and the protection of the other, then must be the supreme objects of solicitude with every legislative Assembly properly compacted for the advancement of public happiness. You cannot except, if we appreciate our *virtual* Representation by its attention to what is most dear and valued among men.

On the first head, let it suffice to cast a retrospective glance on the conduct of the Majority when the legality of General Warrants was brought before this House early in the present reign. Should they defend from arbitrary seizure our Persons and Papers was the question? It was the cause of every class of the People. How peculiarly their care to whom we should look up as the tutelary protectors of our Laws and Liberties! They refused to come to a declaratory Vote so favourable to the constitutional rights of their fellow-subjects! And their acquiescence in the adroit subterfuge to escape indirectly from the question fills the mind with indignant sorrow.—A few months afterward the Court of King's Bench adjudged General Warrants to be illegal and void*.

* See *Money v. Leach*: 3 Burr. Rep. 1742. 1 Blackst. Rep. 555. S. C.

I now pass to the other head ; namely, the protection of Property. Understand me not to mean that Property is unprotected by our Courts of Law. Far be it from me to mutter a hint of a failure of Justice between man and man. I advert to revenue-peculation under the pretext of contributions to the public wants. Setting aside parochial and other Rates, before we were again plunged into the abyss of War, SEVENTEEN NETT MILLIONS OF POUNDS were annually exacted from the People, and after a Peace of nine years, to pay the Interest of the National Debt *then* accrued, and to defray the current expences of a *Peace-establishment* ! The magnitude of this Debt, and the concomitant extent of Taxation [App. L.]—A Debt exceeding all the gold and silver in the hand of Man, and a yearly Taxation probably swallowing up the whole of the Coin in circulation, are evidence conclusive in my judgment to prove that “some-thing is rotten in the State.” Now where can we look, when complaining of a lavish use of public treasure, but to those who hold the purse-strings of the Nation ? Is it to be dissembled or eluded that much of this Expenditure, and a large proportion of this Debt must be posted to the account of ADMINISTRATION-PARLIAMENTS ? Parliaments *influenced* to set no stint to the demands on the public coffers. If the Commons’ House, renewed at short intervals, had wholly emanated *from* and therefore fully sympathized *with* the main body of the People, would there have been, Parliament after Parliament, the ready responsive AYE to ministerial requisitions to take the People’s money ? [App. M.] That this is

the chief source of the burthens we bear, and may have still to dread, it is, I think, difficult to mistake. The more especially when we call to mind that in 1716—before Election-brocage had been elaborated to a system, and when an House of Commons deputed for *three* years protracted its own existence, and that of future Houses to *seven*—our Debt amounted but to *fifty-four* millions. Alas! at the close of the last Session, funded and unfunded, supposing it converted into a three *per cent.* Stock, the Debt exceeded THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-THREE MILLIONS *, and is in a rapid course of augmentation.

You must assign strong reasons to unsettle my conviction, the result (you see) of inquiry and reflection, that this frightful enhancement is not attributable to the evil principle of undue Influence having since that period been able to act with increased, I might say accelerating vigour. This use or abuse of Public Credit by Ministry after Ministry practising on the credulity, or the excessive complaisance (or what may I call it?) of Parliament, speaks for itself. It is evidence ever present of the “*effects*” naturally generated by your “*Government of Influence,*” and an enervated Representation †.

* See MORGAN’S Supplement to a Review of Dr. PRICE’S Writings on the Finances of Great Britain. p. 9. Cadell. 1795.

† “A frugal administration of the public treasure is a sign of a well-governed State, which can never be well governed where the public treasure is wasted and misapplied.” *The Works of Tacitus, with Political Discourses*; by T. GORDON, v. 5. p. 58. 12mo.

It will be no answer to reply that we enjoy many blessings under the existing regimen. Many and great let them be. All the privileges yet remaining to distinguish us from the other Nations of Europe are referable to the portion the People have possessed in their own Government by Representation, imperfect as that Representation has now grown. The People have these benefits not *because* they have little (as some with unparalleled effrontery assert) but *alibo* they have little political power. The true question still continues unanswered—whether a system which has mortgaged the landed Rental of the whole Island, and entailed such enormous burthens on us and our posterity, do not call aloud for amendment somewhere? And it is still open for those who think with me that *that* amendment must be in our defective Representation to ask, as Mr. PITT when a Reformer asked, “ if there always had been an
 “ House of Commons who were the faithful stewards
 “ of the interests of their country, *the diligent checks*
 “ *on the administration of the Finances*, the constitutional
 “ advisers of the executive branch of the Legisla-
 “ ture, the steady and *uninfluenced* friends of the
 “ People, WOULD THE BURTHENS WHICH THE CON-
 “ STITUENTS OF THAT HOUSE WERE NOW DOOMED
 “ TO ENDURE HAVE BEEN INCURRED ? ” — See De-
 brett's Parliamentary Register, v. 18. p. 49. —

“ Whatever (you continue to observe) may be the
 “ defects of the present arrangement, it infallibly
 “ secures a great weight of property to the House of
 “ Commons, by rendering many Seats in that House
 “ *accessible to men of large fortunes, and to those alone—*
 “ by

“ by which means such men are engaged in the
 “ defence of the separate rights and interests of this
 “ branch of the Legislature as are best able to sup-
 “ port its claims. The constitution of *most of the*
 “ *small Boroughs*, especially the Burgage-tenure,
 “ though not formed with this design, contributes to
 “ the same effect ; for the appointment of the *Repre-*
 “ *sentatives* we find commonly *annexed to certain*
 “ *great inheritances.*” p. 489.

No doubt the ruinous costs of contested Elections as at present conducted, throws many of them into their power who possess the deepest purse. Surely Returns procured to Parliament by bearing down rival Candidates thro' dint of money, with a number of Boroughs beside ingrossed by the great Families and by opulent individuals, directly leads in your own phrase, to “ *a confused and ill-digested Oligarchy.*” An evil it behoves us no less to avert than incroachments from any other quarter. For what would be the character of this Oligarchy of Borough-mongers both monied and titled ? What but that of a *fourth* Estate in the realm, enabled by the usurpation of our elective rights, to bully their King and to domineer over the People ? Through a singular infatuation, we should then have “ sacrificed Liberty to a scrupulous adherence to those forms and maxims which were originally established to preserve it.”—In a topic of the magnitude of that we now agitate, it is not worth while to altercate on your enormous solecism in terms—“ *hereditary Representation !*” I cannot however dis-
 miss

miss it without confessing my eagerness to hear, by what process an elective and temporary office (conferred on the individual, not for his own emolument, but in trust for the public benefit) can be transmuted into an absolute estate of inheritance without impairing its functions?

“ *When Boroughs are set to sale*, those men are likely to become purchasers, who are enabled by their talents *to make the best of their bargain.*” p. 489. —Strange language, Sir, if by “*make the best of their bargain*” you mean advance the public good. Sure I am, this wish never induced any one to “*purchase*” a Seat in Parliament. *Non hæc in fœdera.* They who buy will sell.

“ *When Boroughs are set to sale!*” With what indignant surprise would the venerable MAYNARD, the virtuous SOMERS, and the illustrious band who stood forward at the expulsion of the *Tarquin* race of STUARTS—with what indignant surprise would they have started at this expression! It is not for me to undertake to delineate what would have been their emotions at the remainder of your sentence. Often have writers deplored “the evil days” on which it was their lot to have fallen. To vindicate the degeneracy of the times, was a novelty reserved for your moral pen!

Ordinarily, “*the best of the bargain*” has been jobs*; and while we endure the present system of Election,

* I was gratified by finding this opinion confirmed by a Reformer of very high rank, and a great authority. On the expediency

Election, parties of all designations must do the same. To retain power their great business must be to provide a store sufficient to answer the demands of those who possess Borough-interest.

Another part of this "*bargain*" is Bribery. Its constant attendant I am willing to suppose you overlooked; I mean Perjury. Perjury, of which Election-oaths are the main source, and Custom-house and Excise-oaths the tributary streams, is now swollen to a torrent which threatens to sweep away all distinction between right and wrong. After oaths are debased into matters of form is it reasonable to wonder that their sanctity in the minds of many no more inspires religious awe? [App. N.] Stripped of their solemnity, they cease to be unerring tests for the discovery of truth; so that all endeavours at the dispensation of Justice too often prove vain. This fearful inundation of Perjury breaks over every mound of Law that Society can erect to protect Property, Life and Reputation. It is an idle hope that it can be effectually checked while the Hustings from *Caitbness* to *Cornwall* are suffered to resound with Perjuries—While the Candidates and Electors, the sons of the Duke and the Chimney-sweeper who boils a pot, have their consciences steeled by these execrable electioneering practices. *Abeunt studia in*
mores.

pediency of the Nation redeeming the proprietary Boroughs, the DUKE OF RICHMOND remarked, that "the Liberties of a Nation cannot be bought too dear; but *the whole cost of these Boroughs would not amount to the profits of ONE JOBBING CONTRACT.*"—See his Grace's exculpatory evidence on the *Trial of Thomas HARDY. v. 4. p. 14.*—Gurney's edit.

notes. It must be an idle hope when Dignitaries of the established Church misemploy their "heaven-devoted hours" to gloss with accommodating falshoods this disregard of the religion of an oath in order "*to make the best of such bargains.*"

In vain do you pretend, that "when a Seat is no fold, but given by the opulent Proprietor of a Burgage-tenure, the Patron finds his own interest consulted by the reputation and abilities of the Member whom he nominates." p. 489.—How "*the Patron finds his own interest consulted*" in the disposal of Seats is much more satisfactorily explained by DODDINGTON in his *Diary*; and DODDINGTON you must admit is a striking instance of your "*considerable Landholder, a great officer in the State, eminent by his knowledge, eloquence and activity;*"—who deserting his old master for greater expectations, from the son, might, like the crafty statesman of old, after a similar disappointment, "have got him home and hanged himself," had he not commanded six dead Votes in Parliament.—"I must think (DODDINGTON observes) that so much offered and so little asked, in such hands as theirs (the *Pelhams*) and at a time when *Boroughs were a commodity particularly marketable*, could not fail of removing at least resentments and of obtaining pardon." p. 257. 3d edit. And afterward; "I believe (says this right honourable Borough-jobber) there were few who could give his Majesty six MEMBERS FOR NOTHING." p. 282. Again; "Mr. Pelham declared that I had a good deal of MARKETABLE
" WARE

“ WARE (Parliamentary interest) and that if I would
 “ empower him to *offer it all to the King*, without
 “ conditions, he would be answerable *to bring the*
 “ *affair to a good account.*” p. 308. Elsewhere in this
 most curious and instructive Diary, it appears that
the affair was the Treasurership of the Navy, a
 place of vast emolument, as the price of the Mem-
 bers he put into Parliament. *Vulgato imperii ar-*
cano !

“ If certain of the Nobility (you subjoin) hold the
 “ appointment of some part of the House of Com-
 “ mons, *it serves to maintain that alliance between the*
 “ *two branches of the Legislature*, which no good
 “ Citizen would wish to see dissevered ; *it helps to*
 “ *keep the Government of the country in the House of*
 “ *Commons, in which it would not perhaps long continue*
 “ *to reside*, if so powerful and wealthy a part of the
 “ Nation as the Peerage compose were excluded
 “ from all share and interest in its constitution.”
 p. 490.—That it is prudent for the Commons to
 connive at, and of course to concur in, the inter-
 ference of the Lords of Parliament in their Elections
 is too visionary to need a serious refutation. But
 your defence of what the House themselves at the
 commencement of their Session always resolve to be
 “ an high infringement upon the Liberties and Pri-
 “ veleges of the Commons of Great Britain,”
 [App. O.] and your desire to palliate the degrada-
 tion of the Representatives of the English People
 into proxies of the Peers, shall not be passed over
 without suitable animadversion. When the Nobility
 were,

were, by the number of their retainers and partizans, much more powerful than in our days, what stand, Sir, did they make, though leagued with CHARLES, against the People?—Fearful of change, some timid minds disincline to any modification of the elective powers anew, though they acknowledge and deplore the complication of public mischiefs which ensue from the subsisting errors. *You* enter the lists alone, the hardy champion of the “*appointment of part of the House of Commons by the Nobility.*” * To all who reflect that the existence and the value of this Constitution depends on preserving the equipoise between the three Estates, such usurpation presents ample ground of alarm. As “America was said to be conquered in Germany,” so we may fear, if your opinion gain currency, and things should continue to run on in the present channel, that the independency of the Commons’ House may, in after-times, be subdued in the House of the Lords. *Homines per honores ferire* is an old stratagem in politics; perhaps it has not yet grown quite obsolete. What if it should ever ripen into a Court-maxim, that the most meritorious service the Commoner, who sighs for a Coronet, can urge

* On this question even SAM. JOHNSON writes thus: “The usurpation of the Nobility, for they apparently usurp all the influence they gain by fraud, and misrepresentation; I think it certainly lawful, perhaps your duty to resist. What is not their own they have only by robbery.”

urge is, that he has filched a Borough from the People! Before these dealers can "*make the best of their bargain*" by this sort of traffic in "marketable ware," they must trample on the landmarks which our fathers set up to fix the respective boundaries of the two Houses. Recollect that these "*two branches of the Legislature*" have not co-ordinate functions—That they have distinct and discordant duties cast on them. If there be points in the Law and Custom of Parliament better ascertained, and of greater importance than any other, they are,

1. The exclusive privilege of the Commons to grant Supplies.
2. Their right, as the grand Inquest of the Nation, to prefer articles of Impeachment against state-criminals.

To what end, does their *proper* House spurn every Bill drawing money in any shape from the People, when remanded from the Lords' House with amendments the most trivial—if it were not as indispensable that Peers should not by their creatures below be parties to framing Money-bills? And it would be a mockery of Justice, too gross for aggravation, if at any time a prisoner at the Bar of the High Court of Parliament could challenge his accusers for the cause that they were appointed by his Judges. You could not dip into political disquisition and remain ignorant of these things, but you would lead us to confound the great outlines of our Constitution.—Before you publish another impression, I entreat you to reflect again and again whether the admission of so "*powerful and wealthy a part of the Nation as*" the taxed House-

Householders to an active "*share and interest in the constitution of the House of Commons,*" would not conduce more to its respectability than for "*the Nobility*" in defiance of its Sessional Resolutions "*to hold the appointment of any part.*"

You then ask "where would be the *impropriety* or the *inconveniency*, if the King at once should nominate a limited number of his servants to Seats in Parliament?"—P. 490. The same causes ever produce the same effects. The "*King nominates*" the twenty-six Spiritual Lords in the Upper House. The consequence is inevitable. Obedient to the wish of the Court, in the last century all the Bishops, except three, voted *against* the Bill sent up by the Commons to exclude a Popish successor to the Crown! and twenty-four of the episcopal Bench persisted to the last, as appears by public papers, in supporting the American War—"That æra of calamity, disgrace and downfall; an æra which no feeling mind will ever mention without a tear for England"—Whereas a large Majority of the Knights of the Shires, now almost our only constitutional Members, long and frequently declared against it.

"Where would be the *impropriety*, if the King nominate a limited number to Seats?" Sir, I rebut your question by asking, in return, what bias will cleave to Conservators of the Rights of the People nominated by the Crown? And what it is reasonable to expect from men appointed by the very power the acts of whose agents they ought to scan with

with the strictest scrutiny, and their encroachments to withstand with anxious apprehension?—At once the servant of the Crown, and the Representor of the People! It is not easy to conceive the union of these dissonant characters, the Courtier and the Patriot. Could they exercise an independent vote? They would be without the least degree of will; or for what reason is every Member, whom the ardour of debate may hurry into an inadvertent mention of the King's name, instantly called to order? For what reason, but that from this quarter solicitations bear the authority of commands? They would be assembled not to deliberate but to approve; while under other names they might draw private advantage from general calamity. No faith, not sufficiently capacious to digest a legendary tale, but must reject the idea that these *faithful Commons* would not be "*obliged**" to ratify by their voices whatever was prescribed.—With divided services how could they discharge the offices of a Representative, and at the same time satisfy their employer?

After you have thus, Sir, vainly strove to reconcile us to an House of Commons, HALF of which you state to be illegally and unconstitutionally chosen,

* " If a father or a master, any great benefactor, or one on whom my fortune depends, require my Vote, *I give it him of course*; and my answer to all who ask me why I voted so and so, is, that my father, or my master *obliged* me: that *I had received so many favours from, or had so great a dependence upon such a one, that I was obliged to vote as he directed me.*"

PALEY. p. 50.

E

you

you only touch cursorily on "*contracting the duration of Parliament.*" A recurrence to TRIENNIAL ELECTIONS, which would cherish the vital principles of the Constitution, as re-animated after the ever-memorable Revolution, you do not blame. Yet we cannot construe this silence to mean approbation. —Allow me further to observe, that a cloistered Politician, like yourself, who employs his industry to persuade the People to set the exterior of their Constitution above its essentials, ought to be told, and to keep fresh in his memory, the Remonstrance which the first public body in the Kingdom, after the Houses of Parliament, but a few years ago carried to the Throne in its corporate capacity. "The forms of the Constitution," truly said "*the good Citizens*" of the Metropolis—"the forms of the Constitution, like those of Religion, WERE NOT ESTABLISHED FOR THE FORM'S SAKE, BUT FOR THE SUBSTANCE; and we call GOD and Men to witness, that as we do not owe our Liberty to *those nice and subtile distinctions, which Places, Pen-sions, and lucrative Employments have invented*; so neither will we be deprived of it by them; but as it was gained by the stern virtue of our ancestors, by the virtue of their descendants it shall be preserved *."

* Address, Remonstrance, and Petition of the Lord Mayor, Aldermen, and Livery, of the City of LONDON in Common Hall assembled, to the KING, March, 1770.

LETTER III.

" The Supreme Executor acts contrary to his trust, when *he*
 " either employs the force, treasure or offices of the Society to corrupt
 " the Representatives, and gain them to his purposes; or openly pre-
 " engages the Electors and prescribes to their choice, such whom he
 " has by solicitations, threats, promises, or otherwise, won to
 " his designs; and employs them to bring in such, who have
 " promised beforehand what to vote, and what to enact. Thus
 " to regulate Candidates and Electors, and new-model the
 " way of Election, *what is it but to cut up the Government by the*
 " *roots, and poison the very fountain of public security* * ? For the
 " People having reserved to themselves the choice of their Re-
 " presentatives, AS THE FENCE TO THEIR PROPERTIES,
 " could do it for no other end, but that *they might always be*
 " *freely chosen, and so chosen freely act, and advise as the necessity*
 " *of the Commonwealth, and the public good, should, upon examina-*
 " *tion, and mature debate be judged to require.*"—LOCKE; of Civil
 Government; Works. v. 2. p. 302. 4to.

SIR,

YOU have compiled a bulky Quarto to inforce a strict observance of the moral duties in the commerce of domestic society. Among other devices, you have graduated a moral barometer to ascertain the various degrees of guilt contracted by the va-

* It is worthy of remark that LOCKE caught this metaphor from Sir Edw. COKE, who introduces it with the same application.—" Thomas Long gave the Maior of Westbury four pound to be elected Burgesse, who thereupon was elected. . This matter was examined and adjudged in the House of Commons, *secundum consuetudinem Parliamenti*, and the Maior fined and imprisoned, and Long removed: *for this corrupt dealing was to poison the very fountain itself.*"
 —4 Inst. 23.

rious stages of inebriety. [App. P.] Why, instead of bringing the same austerity of doctrine into the civil relations of life, your state-morality should relax so much as to exculpate Legislators in carrying their powers to market, in selling their duty for personal gratifications, I am at a loss to discover. Was it that there would have been no latitude left for the operation of Influence? For if you had not dispensed with their obligations, by a necessary consequence, you must have rigidly reprehended all Parliamentary venality. Consider, public virtue and private morality are nearly allied. A general laxity in *this* cannot fail to operate powerfully on the national manners in *that* particular*. This prostitution of the legislative office no casuistical dexterity in splitting a hair can distinguish from immorality. Is it not beyond doubt or controversy culpable, and an heinous breach of moral fitness to require a gratuity not to cross measures of general utility? So it would be in the case of any individual in a private station. How greatly the moral turpitude is aggravated in an "Attorney for the People," who stands bounden and accountable to them for the faithful discharge of this most sacred of trusts, none can refuse to acknowledge. Assuredly then your Parliamentary Ethics are no less immoral in princi-

* The Gentlemen of the Yorkshire Committee thought such practices subversive of Morals, and exhorted all "resolutely to oppose that system of Parliamentary Corruption, which is alike the bane of national Morality, and the ruin of public Liberty."—WYVILL'S *Political Papers*; v. 2. p. 14.

ple than (I shall prove them to be) pernicious in practice.—Your defence of the Influence of the Crown on Parliament, without which, according to the continued tenour of your essay, the national business would be thrown out, from the internal evidence we may be sure springs from the same despotic notion as the custom prevalent throughout the East. Like your politico-moral Casuistry, the delusive logic of those enslaved nations assumes that there is no obligation to execute the duties of an official trust, unless specially fee'd: accordingly, in those countries even the suitors for Justice never apply to their Judges with an empty hand.

After the indulgence you grant to Parliamentary Corruption, when softened into the milder term of "*Influence*," none could imagine you were serious where you speak of "*a direct reduction of the patronage of the Crown*," though you had not incautiously let drop the veil so far as to disclose a glimpse of your covert design by saying, "but while we dispute concerning different schemes of Reformation, all directed to the same end [a diminution of the Influence of the Crown] a previous doubt occurs in the debate, *whether the end itself be good, or even INNOCENT—whether the Influence so loudly complained of can be destroyed or even diminished with safety to the State.*"—P. 491.

By the word *innocent*, you betray an evident predilection for the indefeazible divine right of Kings, and the "bowstring maxim" of the passive obedience of Subjects, however you may elsewhere ostentatiously

disclaim these pestilent delusions. None but a disciple of FILMER, and this is not the only mark of your affinity, would attach *guilt* on the thirty Counties, on the Capital, and on many other of the Cities and principal Towns in the Island, who in 1780, called loudly for a retrenchment in the expenditure of public money, and other accessary regulations, to restore to the People the Freedom of Parliament by a reduction of what they justly termed "THE GREAT AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE OF THE CROWN." [App. Q.] Guilt, which if credit be given to your effusions, was then incurred by more than one hundred thousand Petitioners and Associates, who believed that for their exertions they merited the praise and the thanks of their country. This is not all—the sequel of this national effort to decrease the funds of Corruption can be no less reprehensible. I allude to the death-bed confession (I do not say expiatory repentance) of the *American War* Parliament. The House of Commons who resolved, "That it is necessary to declare that the Influence of the Crown hath increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished*," cannot stand "innocent" in your eyes.

Here, let every of your readers pause to revolve, that having in an unwary moment exposed in language too obvious for misapprehension, and too explicit to be explained away, your hidden purpose of insinuating doctrines subversive of the *principles* of

* 6 Ap. 1780. *Jour. Com.* v. 37. p. 763.

our free Constitution, in your *second* edition you substituted "*safe*," for the expressive word "*innocent*," tho' thereby the last member of your period is rendered tautological and unmeaning*. On your amended judgment, you deemed it, Sir, more prudent to resort to your phantom "*danger*" to scare us, than it was to conjure up in the broad daylight of the eighteenth century the chimeras of Priestcraft—Illusions only terrible while they hovered in the gloom of ignorance and monkish superstition, "when Reason hylt herself in cloudes of nyghte."

"Were the measures of *Government* (say you) opposed from nothing but principle, *Government* ought to have nothing but the rectitude of its measures to support *them*; but since *opposition* springs from other motives, *Government* must possess an Influence to counteract that *opposition*—*to produce not a bias of the passions, but a neutrality!*" p. 492.—Your hope to *neutralize* the democratic acid of Representation with the *alkali* of regal Influence, and yet to preserve its essential properties uninjured vanishes on the experiment, as I am about to prove. But your abuse of the word

* In the *second* and in subsequent editions the passage runs thus: "whether the end itself be good, or *safe*—whether the Influence so loudly complained of can be destroyed, or even diminished *without danger* to the State," p. 491. Why in still later editions do you say "*much* diminished?" By these retractions it should seem you are fully conscious that you had over-shot yourself. Or has some friend kindly told you so?

Government calls for some previous remark. You avail yourself of its ambiguity as in vulgar use. By this word, in its correct acceptation, we intend the *plan* of civil polity established in any country. You confound it with the *administration* by the executive authorities—Willing, after the fashion of other courtly writers, to impute a want of confidence in the projects of the Ministry for the time being, to disaffection to the Constitution itself *. Thus much may serve to show your verbal accuracy. But whenever *Government*, in your restricted sense, bring forward propositions embracing the welfare of the State, they never would be rejected by an House of Commons fairly deputed by popular Suffrage. How requisite soever Influence may be in a Legislative Assembly constituted in a way so miserably degenerate as that you advise us to persist in, I am bold to say that the clamours of a contentious systematic “*Opposition*” would be as little attended to among real Representatives as they are in a Vestry or Common-Council. Not, Sir, that your reasoning is in this respect at all inconsistent: First, you insist on the expediency of adhering to a scheme of Election by which at least one HALF of the House of Commons (you confess) is illegally and unconstitutionally created. Afterward, naturally enough, you descant on the necessity of Influence to bribe a Legislature

* “ Under this pompous name of *Government*, will nothing but the poultry interest, or humour, of the Minister be couched.” BOLINGBROKE; *Ded. to Dissertation on Parties*.

thus packed by means equally venal with such an end to despatch the national business. You would persevere in errors that you may justify abuses. Errors and abuses moving in a circle, and mutually productive and reproductive of each other. To do you justice, so far you argue with perfect accuracy. We are agreed, that Members who buy their Seats will thwart every proposition till they have "*made the best of their bargain*" to reimburse their Election expences, by stipulating for a share of the bounty dispensed by the Crown. But what could induce men whom the spontaneous voice of their fellow-citizens has sent to the chamber of Legislation not to lend their concurrence to every measure calculated for the common advantage? Whence these alarms about reviving the dormant principle of the independency of Parliament? From what has been we are to collect what will be. You should have given your readers a reference to some pages of our Parliamentary History in proof that Members returned by the Election of the People have refused their consent from factious views*. You were unable to find any such case; for I shall presently

* "The granting of money is the only case, where we can suppose the Members generally engaged by their private interest, to oppose what is necessary for the public service. But this interest is so small with regard to each particular Member that it can never be of any weight. This is demonstrated, Sir, from the whole course of our history: for I defy any man to give me an instance, where the Parliament denied granting what was necessary for the public service, unless they were denied justice with regard to the redress of grievances,

presently have occasion to remark that you are driven to take refuge in the wilds of conjecture. Why then they to whom the administration of the active powers of Government is committed would never, acting with honest views, feel themselves distressed by the advice and inspection of the independent Representatives of independent Electors, and you will hardly say that with other intentions they should be supported at all. Of one thing we might be satisfied, the independent Representatives of independent Electors would never abandon us to the ambition of a Minister, or the pique of a King. On the other hand, this Influence is capable of being employed to dreadful purposes. What surety have we that a faction may not, hereafter, gain the ascendancy in the direction of affairs, and the personal aggrandizement of a cabinet-cabal be set before the safety of the Empire? *Suppose* an imperative Influence should quash by the previous Question every endeavour at inquiry. RESPONSIBILITY sinks to an empty sound whenever the Parliament is prompt to suspend on *Confidence* its capacity of superintendence and controlment,

But enough! Now to suppose your terrors realized—that we *had* an House of Commons wild and infamous enough “to obstruct the conduct of “ public affairs by a *wanton and perverse opposition.*”

“ances, or unless they had well-grounded apprehensions that “the money would be misapplied.”—Lord Strange on Mr. Cornwall’s Motion in 1742 for excluding Placemen and Pensioners. See *the History and Proceedings of the House of Commons.*”

p. 492.—In this conjuncture you are not to be told, that the Crown possesses an obvious remedy. It can and does dissolve an Assembly so flagitiously refractory. The Country, on the contrary, tho' they should find the Parliament debauched by Influence, and countenancing the most ruinous schemes of a Court, may be condemned to wait till *the seven* years are elapsed. A period which political arithmeticians have found to be equal to *one half* of the probable expectation of human life, taken at the most favourable age.

With regard to your observation that “before the
“accession of JAMES the first; or at least during the
“reigns of his three immediate predecessors, the
“Government of England was *a Government by*
“*force*, that is, the King carried his measures
“*by intimidation.*” p. 493—We may safely assert that our present civil establishment is no more connected with the stretches of power, under colour of Prerogative, antecedent to the Revolution of 1688, than it is with the savage edicts of the Norman invader. If attempts must be made to break the spirit of Englishmen—if we must either be awed by Prerogative, or be inveigled by Influence, doubtless our forefathers made an ill exchange for us. *Prerogative alarms when it attacks.* It becomes us therefore to be well advised whether it be not better to face this open enemy rather than to prefer the insidious overtures of Influence, which, instead of rousing the centinels, seduces them treacherously to surrender the garrison,—A strong sense of recent
2 danger

danger actuated our ancestors to repair the breaches made in the Constitution by Prerogative, and to throw up fresh bulwarks against it. They left us a fortress impregnable to all assaults in future. Happy would it have been for their children had they been skilled sufficiently to countermine a plan of attack, masked under established formalities, by sapping the foundations to the centre, while the surface remains intire. *

Natural Philosophy imparts that the apparent dissolution of a substance is no more than its reproduction in a different shape. Something analogous you hold to take place in the political world. "After the Restoration (you go on to say) there succeeded in its place, and *since the Revolution has been methodically pursued*, THE MORE SUCCESSFUL EXPEDIENT OF INFLUENCE. Now we remember what passed between the *loss of terror* and the establishment of Influence." p. 493.—It has been received as a maxim, that it is in the nature of bad princes to deal out honours, and lavish their largesses with a prodigal hand; whereas good princes knowing themselves to reign in the hearts of the People, are invariably sparing in the distribution of titles, and frugal in their donatives. The justness of this rule will be illustrated, and the complexion of your admired system of Influence displayed in native

* "The state of things is much altered in this country, since it was necessary to protect our Representatives against the direct power of the Crown. *We have nothing to apprehend from Prerogative*, BUT EVERY THING FROM UNDUE INFLUENCE." JUNIUS.

colours,

colours, by tracing, though but slightly, its rise and progress.

The infamy of this invention to make the will and pleasure of the Prince the measure of executive Government, and the real source of Law, * by conciliating with favours when he had not the strength to intimidate, belongs to the eleventh Louis. This royal ruffian, *Nerone ipso Neronior*, was bent on delivering the Crown from Wardship †—for so he chose to style the lawful control of the Assembly of the States—and he compassed his aim by the nefarious resource you defend. Listen to a witness above exception. Dr. ROBERTSON informs the world, that this gloomy tyrant “was the first monarch in Europe
 “ who discovered the method of managing those
 “ great Assemblies, in which the Feudal policy had
 “ vested the power of granting Subsidies, and of
 “ imposing taxes. *He first taught other Princes the*
 “ *fatal art of beginning their attack on public Liberty,*
 “ *by corrupting the source from which it should flow.*
 “ *By exerting all his power and address in influencing*
 “ *the Election of Representatives, by bribing or over-*
 “ *awing the Members, and by various changes which*
 “ he artfully made in the form of their deliberations;
 “ Louis acquired such entire direction of these
 “ Assemblies, that from being the vigilant guardians
 “ of the privileges and property of the People, he rendered them tamely subservient, in promoting the most
 “ odious measures of his reign.”—(*The History of the*

* *Cuncta Legum & Magistratuum in se trahens Princeps.*

† Mettre le Roy hors de page.

Reign of the Emperor Charles V. v. i. p. 100. 4to.)
 That this dark and crooked policy, dates its origin among us from the "*Restoration*" of the profligate CHARLES, is most certain. In the same spirit, this *Stuart* transplanted hither many other scandalous practices and opinions acquired in the court of the despot, where he spent his early life. [App. R.]—The introduction of these shameful *artes et instrumenta regni* forms a memorable epocha in the annals of Parliament; and I now place against the praise of a Collegian, the condemnatory judgement of an honest and enlightened Statesman. When newly tried, the Chancellor HYDE improbated these golden philtres to excite the illicit affections of Parliament. *He* would have the Members under no Influence but that of "*Reason and Policy.*" He indeed was a supporter of the Constitution, not the partizan of "*Government.*" In opposition to those who laboured to remove every obstacle to the plots of the reigning King, who panted after arbitrary power, this faithful follower of his fortunes in their reverse, counselled him to govern on the plain and open *English* "*Principles of Honour and Wisdom,* which had "*hitherto swayed the House in all matters of public concernment.*"—CLARENDON is no light authority, and I must cite the passage at length where he lashes with much severity your false substitute for "*Reason and Policy,*" for "*Honour and Wisdom.*" This great and good man would not let this novel device of his cotemporaries to curb the free spirit of Parliaments descend to posterity, unattended

tended by his exculpation. He arraigns "the chief
 " men of the Court," because they "took more pains
 " to ingratiate themselves than to advance the in-
 " terest of their master ; and *instead of pressing what*
 " *was desirable upon the strength of Reason and Policy,*
 " *as they had used to do, and by which the major part*
 " *of the House had usually concurred with them,* they
 " now applied themselves with address to those who
 " had always frowardly opposed whatsoever they
 " thought would be grateful to the King : and de-
 " fired rather to *buy their Votes and concurrence by*
 " *promises of Reward and Preferment (which is the*
 " *most dishonourable and unbristly Brokery that can be*
 " *practiced in a Parliament,* which from this time
 " was much practiced, and *brought many ill things*
 " *to pass)* than to prevail upon those weighty
 " and important arguments which would bear the
 " light. Which *low artifice* raised the insolence of
 " those, which would, *as easily as it had been,* have
 " been still over-ruled and suppressed ; and was
 " quickly *discerned by those others, who, upon the*
 " *Principles of Honour and Wisdom, had hitherto swayed*
 " *the House in all matters of public concernment,* and
 " who now concluded, by those new condescensions,
 " that the former sober spirit and resolution was
 " laid aside, and that peevish men would be com-
 " pounded with ; and so resolved to sit still, or look
 " on, till the success of the stratagem might be dis-
 " cerned." (*The Life of Edw. Earl of CLARENDON ;*
written by himself. v. 2. p. 285. 8vo.)—How dif-
 ferent this from your proflusions !

Of

Of the inducement to adopt your "*expedient*," but too "*successful*," BOLINGBROKE also gives an account disagreeing *toto caelo* from yours, and corroborative of what I have with no small satisfaction just extracted. His sentiments are too full to the purpose not to be offered to your perusal. "This *expedient* of corrupting
 " Parliaments (says the noble author) began under
 " the administration of that boisterous, over-bearing, dangerous Minister, CLIFFORD. *As long as*
 " *there remained any pretence to say that the Court*
 " *was in the interest of the People, the expedient of*
 " *Bribery was neither wanted, nor practised.* When
 " the Court was evidently in another interest, the
 " necessity and the practice of bribing the Representatives of the People commenced." *Works. v. 2. p. 57. 4^{to}.*

Concise as is this exposition of the motives for having recourse to Influence, little need be added except our increased experience of its truth, and that its sphere of action has of late years been considerably enlarged. For since the publication of the Dissertation on Parties, regal and ministerial Influence has, with disastrous success, stricken its roots wider and deeper. Its ramifications are shot out into every corner of the kingdom. Not to multiply authorities, [App. S.] I shall bring only one more; and I bring Mr. BURKE to testify, that events for nearly a century and a half, fatally confirm all that the wisdom of CLARENDON deprecated. On submitting to the House of Commons in 1780, his salutary "plan for
 " the better security of the Independency of Parliament,"

liament," this Orator, with the eloquence of truth, breaks out in this strain—"What, I confess, " was uppermost with me, what I bent the whole force " of my mind to, was *the reduction of that corrupt Influence*; which is itself the perennial spring of all " prodigality, and of all disorder; which loads us " more than millions of debt; which takes away " vigour from our arms, wisdom from our councils, " and every shadow of authority and credit from the " most venerable parts of our Constitution." (*Works*. v. 2. p. 177.)—To these incontestible and unequivocal testimonies against you, I add no observation of my own. I only pray judgement between us.—

As we are on the topic of "terror," it is material moreover to tell you, that at the same time that "*the King carried his measures in Parliament by intimidation*;" Judges at the devotion of the Court were placed on the Bench to brow beat, and fine, and imprison Jurors who acquitted men obnoxious to "*Government*," if I may use the word in your confined acceptance. Since BUSHELL'S Case,* this outrage has not been attempted; and, most happily for our Lives and Liberties, Juries have hitherto escaped the contamination of Influence. Divested of all Influence, their Verdicts of Not Guilty maintain a free Press, and will ever (I hope) prove an insuperable bar to the cumulative, constructive Treasons of Crown-Lawyers. Had it happened otherwise, had they not been left without hope and without fear, to follow the dictates of their consciences, should we

* Vaughan's Rep. 135.

not have had a cautionary chapter from you to inculcate the necessity of the Influence of the Crown on Juries? What a field to expatiate, that Jurymen, if left to think and act for themselves, would never convict seditious Libellers and Traitors. How plausible that there should be the same "*expedient*" to gain over Jurymen, as to gain over the Houses of Parliament. For did not experience evince the contrary, it would have been as colourable a presumption that without "*intimidation or Influence,*" Juries would not discharge their duty to the country, as that men freely and fairly chosen, would perversely retard or reject in Parliament measures tending to the benefit of the State.

It is futile to press on our recollection for the purpose you would serve, the unhappy occurrences occasioned by the contest between CHARLES the first and the Parliament. I peremptorily deny that his misfortunes can be justly referred to a want of this sort of Influence. History vouches to the truth of my assertion. Peruse the eventful period from the compulsory abdication of JAMES, to the elevation of the House of Brunswic-Lunenburgh—when Parliaments had nothing to dread, and little to expect, from the agents of the executive Government, and when the effervescence necessarily attendant on a Revolution, was far from subsided—when withal numbers of the Commonwealth's men were yet alive who must have cherished a fond remembrance of "the good old cause." Lest I should trespass beyond the due bounds of epistolary diffusion, I select

proofs

proofs only during the reign of WILLIAM. He who, devoid of all prior claim, had the diadem fixed on his brow, upon certain terms and conditions by the gift of the People—He who had not Influence in Parliament sufficient to carry through his private and personal measures—He who was *ten* years in procuring a Civil-List to be settled on him for life—He who was compelled to revoke a grant to his Dutch favourite BENTINCK, and to send away a Regiment of foreign Life-guards, “the companions of his victories,” whom he more than once importuned the Commons to suffer him to keep about his person—He who was not always soothed with Addresses echoing back the royal Speech, but who sometimes was mortified by sullen expostulation, not to say rude remonstrance—[App. T.]. He, Sir, even WILLIAM, fate securely. The memory of these things entitles me flatly to contradict your supposition. Further; it will be no easy task for you to fasten on a straggling incident of national detriment during this arduous reign, arising either from Triennial Parliaments, or the non-existence of Influence. The good sense of the Nation, assured that its Liberties, civil and religious, depended on his wearing the Crown, and were safe in his hand, supported him against the exiled hereditary Sovereign, formidable both by foreign alliance, and by numerous adherents within this Island.

Since WILLIAM, a foreigner, and of cold and repulsive demeanour, against whom the minds of multitudes were inflamed by religious persuasions, or

exasperated by political prejudices, could by an elective title wield his sceptre securely and successfully, before the Influence of the Crown had obtained, and while Parliaments were no more than Triennial, and that without the shadow of a personal claim—surely, Mr. PALEY, you insult the best of Kings by sending abroad an idea that Influence is *now* necessary.—For a native prince adorned with attractions of private character that might be dangerous to the national Freedom, were they not counter-balanced by the goodness of his heart! What has he to fear? He fills the throne of his ancestors, and has seen his Court through a long reign thronged with the hereditary enemies of his House, of a sudden transformed into closest friends?—Let us be told no more of your hard option between a “*Government by force*” and a “*Government of Influence*,” and may we apply with emulation and ardour to procure a Parliament as free from “*terror*,” as superior to venality.

You next remark that “in the British Colonies of North America, the late Assemblies possessed much of the power and constitution of our House of Commons. *The King and Government of Great Britain held no patronage in the country*, which could create attachment and Influence sufficient to counteract that restless arrogating spirit which in popular assemblies, when left to itself, will never brook an authority that checks and interferes with its own. To this cause, excited per-

“happ

“ haps by *some unseasonable provocations*, we may at-
 “ tribute, as to their true and proper original, we
 “ will not say *the misfortunes*, but *the changes* that
 “ have taken place in the British Empire.”—p.
 493. With much art you have kept out of sight
 the great efficient cause of the secession of our
 Trans-Atlantic brethren. What you glide over with
 the smooth phrase of “ *unseasonable provocations*” I
 must push forward into notice.—The Anglo-Ame-
 ricans read their lesson in the fundamental principle
 of English Liberties. Every argument against the
 the right of CHARLES to levy Ship-money by pre-
 tence of Prerogative convinced them that they
 ought to rank the disposal of their own Property by
 legislative Trustees of their own appointment fore-
 most among the prerogatives of freemen. By every
 constitutional document, from the Statute of Tal-
 liage to the Speeches of CAMDEN against American
 Taxation, [App. U.] they were instructed that to give
 up the power of taxing themselves was to surrender
 their dearest rights and most precious interests at dis-
 cretion. True to their duty to themselves, after the
 British Parliament declared its right “ to bind them
 “ in all cases whatsoever,” and when our House of
 Commons by undertaking to give and grant their
 money without their consent, actually assumed the
 entire command of their fortunes, the English blood
 boiled in their veins. Taxation without Represen-
 tation is Tyranny, and your Parliament must belie
 (remonstrated three millions of HAMPENS) those
 principles of Freedom our common ancestors died

to maintain, before "it can take and use our property when and in what manner it pleases*." Perceiving that this country turned a deaf ear to their appeal, they refused to deliver themselves up to be the victims of STATUTEABLE PLUNDER †, and renounced all dependence on us. After their resistance had manifested our inability to reduce them to "unconditional submission" by the point of the bayonet, conciliatory propositions were transmitted to the United States by special Commissioners sent to them to concede, among other things, "that an agent " or agents from the different States should have "the privilege of a Seat and a voice in the Parliament of Great Britain ‡." But the season of reunion had been contemned by the insolence or the treachery of the then Ministry, and every overture of accommodation was rejected. *Procul absit omen*, May no such obdurate fatuity preside in our councils when the hour arrives (it may be at hand) that the Public at large, stimulated by our growing burthens, at last set themselves to a serious inquiry—whether it will not be more expedient to put themselves and their property under the safeguard of an

* See the *Address in 1774 to the People of Great Britain from the general Congress*.

† "These devoted Colonies were judged to be in such a state, as to present victories without bloodshed, and all the easy emoluments of statuteable plunder."—*Declaration of the Congress, July, 1775*.

‡ See the *British Commissioners' Letter to the Congress in 1778*.

integral Representation than to leave their interests with an Assembly of which the major number is appointed by a trifling and fictitious fraction of the Nation? Whenever the mass of the People bestow on this question the attention it deserves, they will assuredly find that *Constitutional Reform* is the essential preliminary to *Public Oeconomy*, not to insist on other considerations. Then they will reclaim their exclusive right to the appointment of the Parliamentary Assessors of the public Taxes. I turn my eyes from the issue of a refusal to reinstate them in this rightful inheritance, after they have once asked how can Taxmasters like the Cornish Burgesses, or the Delegates of the Scottish Burghs, or the Cinque-Port Barons, our *virtual* Representatives, accord with that first of constitutional principles that Englishmen are to be taxed only by themselves or their Representatives?

You, Sir, avoid this discussion, and assign a cause unfounded in fact for the defection of the Republic of America. The Crown "*beld*" very considerable "*patronage*" there. Almost every place of power and profit, from the Governor downward, in nearly all the Colonies was in the disposal of the British Court. In BOSTON even the Magistrates were not chosen by the inhabitants. But the dominion of strangers is ever odious. When did a People abide any length of time patient of deputed authority*?

* The word *Rebellion* (*re-bellium*) bespeaks the propensity of a conquered People to revolt.

I do not believe you will be able to point out a single instance, where a Nation, when it felt itself sufficiently strong, delayed to shake off Government at *second-hand*. Men are "*restless*" under and ill "*brook*" provincial dependency. Witness a Sister-Island, governed on the exact model of our own, though distracted by religious dissensions, and though Influence has too much sway—Did not IRELAND seize with ardour the "golden opportunity" to emancipate herself from English Legislation?—The consequences of this unhappy struggle lie heavy on us, and long must they lie. They are a fine we must be content to pay for *our* folly or crime. If it were time to separate, why did we not part on friendly terms? Then the remembrance of past kindneses, and the interchange of benevolent offices, endearing us to each other, must have constantly strengthened the mutual ties of interest and blood. Perhaps the Anglo-Americans were children arrived at maturity, who stood no longer in need of the tutelage of the mother-country. Because the parent-state assisted in regulating and protecting the infant-establishments of her offspring, could the right follow to coerce them in their riper years till "prostrate at her feet?"—It was by insolence in her rulers like this, and not through any want of Influence, that BRITAIN precipitated the loss of, if she did not throw away, her American territories. By menaces like these, and by conduct equally infatuated, we succeeded in alienating their minds, and at last

drove the irritated Colonists to exclaim with one heart and one voice,

" Fas mihi Graiorum sacrata resolvere jura,

" Fas odiffe viros ;.....

" teneor patriæ nec legibus ullis."

LET-

LETTER IV.

“ No slavery can be so effectually brought and fixed upon us
 “ as Parliamentary slavery. By the Corruption of Parliament, and
 “ the absolute INFLUENCE of a King, or his Minister, on the
 “ two Houses, we return into that state, to deliver or secure us
 “ from which Parliaments were instituted, and are really go-
 “ verned by the arbitrary will of one man. Our whole Consti-
 “ tution is at once dissolved. Many securities to Liberty are pro-
 “ vided, but the integrity which depends on the Freedom and In-
 “ dependency of Parliament, is the key-stone that keeps the whole to-
 “ gether. If this be shaken our Constitution totters. If it be
 “ quite removed our Constitution falls into ruin.—The single
 “ reign of HENRY the eighth will serve to show, that no ty-
 “ ranny can be more severe than that which is exercised by a con-
 “ cert with Parliament; that arbitrary Will may be made the
 “ sole rule of Government, even while the names and forms of
 “ a free Constitution are preserved; that for a Prince, or his Mi-
 “ nister, to become our tyrant, there is no need to abolish
 “ Parliaments; there is no need that he who is master of one
 “ part of the Legislature should endeavour to abolish the other
 “ two, when he can use upon every occasion the united strength
 “ of the whole; there is no need he should be a tyrant in the
 “ gross, when he can be so in detail, nor in name, when he
 “ can be so in effect; that for Parliaments to establish tyran-
 “ ry, there is no need therefore to repeal Magna Charta, or
 “ any other of the great supports of our Liberty. It is enough,
 “ if they put themselves corruptly and servilely under the INFLUENCE
 “ of such a Prince, or such a Minister.—On the whole, I con-
 “ clude that in the possible case here supposed, the first and
 “ principal object will be to destroy the Constitution, under pretence
 “ of preserving the Government, by corrupting our Parliaments.—
 “ There is surely too much reason to suspect that the enemies of
 “ our Constitution may attempt hereafter to govern by Corrup-
 “ tion when it is pleaded for and recommended, as a necessary ex-
 “ pedient

" *pedient of Government, by men whose birth, education, and for-*
 " *tune, aggravate their crime and their folly; by men whom Honor,*
 " *at least, should restrain from favoring so dishonorable a cause;*
 " *and BY MEN WHOSE PECULIAR OBLIGATIONS TO PREACH*
 " *UP MORALITY should restrain them at least from being the*
 " *PREACHERS OF AN IMMORALITY, ABOVE ALL OTHERS,*
 " *ABOMINABLE IN ITS NATURE, AND PERNICIOUS IN*
 " *ITS EFFECTS."*—BOLINGBROKE; *Works*, v. 2. p. 137.

4to.

SIR,

AS I borrowed the motto to my last Letter from
 LOCKE, I have prefixed one to the present from
 BOLINGBROKE, to show you that the most eminent
 of the Whigs and the Tories, men who perhaps
 accord on no other point, unite in their detestation
 of that Influence on Parliament, to which you are
 so devoutly attached.—Must it not astonish every
 one that you, in the chair of Morality, promulgate
 doctrines which revolt even the moral feelings of a
 BOLINGBROKE?

Were it not for the pernicious consequences, it
 would be amusive to contemplate how imperceptibly
 and plausibly mankind are beguiled by the power
 of words. Till of late years, money was taken
 from us by the plain old word a *Tax*; now as the
 Language refines, our purses are emptied by a *Com-*
mutation. In like manner, practices, when branded
 as Bribery and Corruption, startled our ancestors:
 but since this coarse phraseology has passed away
 with the fashion of the times, the things themselves
 seem, by the magic of sounds, to have cast off
 their

their offensive properties, and to you and to others, appear not harmless merely, but highly useful under the more polished shape of Influence.

“ *When the mind is once taught to endure without uneasiness a consciousness of guilt the character is prepared for every compliance.*” There you breathe the genuine spirit of Morality. The moral sense is soon worn callous. The first theme therefore, and the last with writers who have instructed mankind in their “duty toward their neighbours,” has been the *inviolability of Principle*. They draw a strait and perspicuous line between right and wrong. Not so the apologist for Pension-Parliaments. The nature of that subject necessitated you to soften down its harshness of feature; but the shades of difference are so dubious that, to common perceptions, the tints melt into each other. Reflections, such as these, occurred to me on reading your “protest against any construction by which what is here said shall be attempted to be applied to the justification of bribery, or of any clandestine reward or solicitation whatever. The very *secrecy* of such negotiations *confesses* or begets a consciousness of guilt. —Our *apology* relates solely to that Influence, which results from the acceptance or expectation of public preferments.”—p. 494. In turning over the leaves of your production we perpetually recal the sentiments of former writers, frequently copied literally, and always without acknowledgment. [App. W.] Yet in the striking resemblance I have now to point out there is no suspicion of pla-

plagiarism. Similarity of situation naturally suggested the similarity of the distinction. *Father Foigard* is quieting the scruples of a Lady's Maid, whom he tempted by the offer of a few guineas to betray her Mistress. "Won't the money look like a *bribe*, " Doctor"—asks the Waiting Woman? The reverend Casuist satisfies her by replying with all becoming gravity—"if you receive the money beforehand 'twill be, *logiqué a bribe*; but if you stay till afterward, 'twill be *only a gratification**!"—Wonderfully does the Jesuit-Confessor chime in unison with the Moralist. You, Sir, intreat us to believe your political casuistry is not to reconcile "*bribery*" to tender consciences. Heaven forbid! Your "*apology relates solely to the Influence arising from the acceptance or expectation of public preferences!*"

Seriously, your "*protest against Bribery*," Mr. PALEY, comes very awkwardly, knowing as you must that *your* House of Commons, with only HALF of its Members chosen legally and constitutionally, can never be filled without it. In my eyes, he who receives a sum at once appears less dangerous than he whose continuance in a post of profit depends on his Vote. Of a Pension, as well as of a Sinécure, there can be but one opinion; and what is a Place with a Salary but a standing "*bribe*?" And therefore a Clause, now repealed, was inserted in the Act of Settlement, to incapacitate any salaried or pensioned

* See the *Beaux Stratagem*, by Farquhar.

person from serving as a Member of the House of Commons. An advantageous appointment for a Member or his relative may be a more decent vehicle to convey a reward for Parliamentary services; but when a poison is in some degree disguised, the greater is the danger.—You favour permanent “*bribery*” by lucrative “*preferments*,” but forbid the occasional acceptance of sums of money: as consistently might you plead for Felony and prohibit petit Larceny. In your mode of reasoning, the Journeyman Weaver, whose “poverty but not his” will consents,” to take a “*bribe*” for his Suffrage, to contribute toward the subsistence of a starving family, is more criminal than the worthless Member, who commanding all the necessities and comforts of life, vilely hires out his voice for the emoluments of office, and turns a traitor to the People that he may riot in luxury and extravagance.

You now observe that “in political above all” other subjects, the arguments, or rather the conjectures on each side of a question, are often so “equally poised, that the wisest judgements may” be held in suspense. These I call subjects of “*indifference*.” But again, when the subject is not “*indifferent* in itself, it will appear such to a great” part of those to whom it is proposed, for want of “information, or reflection, or experience, or capacity, to collect and weigh the reasons by which” either side is supported. These are subjects of “*apparent indifference*.”—p. 494. Finding myself utterly unable to guess what you intend by “*political*”
“*subjects*”

"*subjects of indifference*," I greatly regret that instead of this gratuitous assumption, you did not stoop to exemplify your hypothesis by facts * How can we encounter phantoms? For one, I am yet to learn what solitary Vote of a public nature can be called "*indifferent*." Was any Vote, for example, which would have helped to preserve PEACE and PLENTY "*indifferent*?" Is any Vote either really or "*apparently indifferent*" which would help to stop the wide-spread miseries of WAR, after sad experience had shown that the attainment of the object proposed was as impracticable as it was detestable, and that to persevere was only to accumulate expence and disgrace? Or, is any Vote "*indifferent*" which extends the revenue-code of pains and penalties to invade the security of domestic life, no longer permitting the trader under the dominion of the EXCISE to be the master of his door?—What is the regulation of interior œconomy, or what the question of foreign policy, that five hundred and fifty-eight *chosen* Englishmen are incompetent to decide? To qualify for attendance on public business requires no superlative powers of intellect, as you seem to think. The means to form a sound opinion on public transactions are accessible to the understandings of plain men. Recent experience is spreading the persuasion

* "He that would not deceive himself, ought to build his hypothesis on matter of fact, and make it out by sensible experience, and not presume on matter of fact because of his hypothesis, that is because he supposes it to be so."—LOCKE; *Essay on Human Understanding*. b. 2. ch. 1. s. 10.

wider and wider that the luminous endowments of our Statesmen have tended rather to dazzle and to mislead by their illusive brilliancy than to elucidate right courses for national prosperity. Whether you are to be numbered among those who do not discriminate between the gift of oratory and the faculty of judgement I know not, I am one who have long thought the blaze of eloquence is oftener employed to fascinate or inflame than to illuminate. To me it appears that the light of common sense shining in well-intentioned and uninfluenced breasts would be a sufficient, probably the safest, guide to an Assembly of Legislators *.—I repeat my request that you would give some examples of these myste-

* After SWIFT has with his peculiar plainness enforced and illustrated the competency of popular Assemblies, I should be without excuse, were I to dwell longer on that point. " Let us suppose (says this writer) five hundred men, mixed in point of sense and honesty, as usually assemblies are; and let us suppose these men proposing, debating, resolving, voting according to the mere natural motions of their own little or much reason and understanding; I do allow, that abundance of indigested and abortive, many pernicious and foolish overtures would arise and float a few minutes, but then they would die and disappear. Because this must be said in behalf of human kind, that common sense and plain reason while men are disengaged from acquired opinions, will ever have some general influence upon their minds; whereas the species of folly and vice are infinite, and so different in every individual, that they could never procure a majority, if other corruptions did not enter to pervert men's understandings, and misguide their wills."—*Of the Contests and Dissentions in Athens and Rome. ch. 5.*

ries in the occult science of Government—these Parliamentary enigmas, which would appear inexplicable to “ a great part of ” an Assembly that in your estimation is composed “ of the most considerable Landholders and Merchants of the Kingdom ; the heads of the Army, the Navy, and the Law, the occupiers of the great Offices in the State ; together with many private individuals eminent by their knowledge, eloquence, or activity . ” —Are these your accomplished Legislators, whom you now think it convenient to degrade as “ wanting information, or reflection, or experience, or capacity to collect and weigh the reasons by which either side is supported ? ” You are entangled in your own web beyond the possibility of extrication. When dissuading us from a Reform in the Representation, you scruple not to ask, “ does any new scheme promise to collect together MORE WISDOM or produce firmer integrity ? ” —Your arguments are at cross purposes. Now, offering excuses for our Election-system, you think fit to aver that “ in the several plans which have been suggested of an equal or a reformed Representation, it will be difficult to discover any proposal that has a tendency to throw more of the business of the Nation into the House of Commons, or to collect A SET OF MEN MORE FIT TO TRANSACT THAT BUSINESS, or in general more interested in the national happiness and prosperity . ” —p. 490. Now, apologizing for the Influence of the Crown, with ludicrous inconsistency you affirm that “ to a great part ” of this very best of all possible collections of the

"wisdom and integrity" of the whole British Nation, the most important questions appear "indifferent"—Nay, that "for want of information, or reflection, or experience, or capacity," they are incapable of "weighing the reasons by which either side is supported." But the "acceptance or expectation of public preferences" makes every thing "plain and clear" to the meanest understandings*. *Ibi fas, ubi maxima merces.* On every Division they who "want capacity" to discern the public interest can obey the beck of the Minister.

You afterward allege, "according as the disposition of Parliament is friendly or adverse to the recommendation of the Crown in matters which are really or apparently indifferent, as indifference hath been now explained, the business of empire will be transacted *with ease and conveniency*, or embarrassed with endless contention and difficulties." p. 495. Again I have to express my regret that you should have rested content with vague allegations. Assertions might be answered by assertions. But I call on you, Sir, to specify *when* the business of

* However your argument may create surprise, it is yours only by adoption.

"What makes all doctrines plain and clear?

"About two hundred pounds a year.

"And that which was prov'd true before,

"Prove false again?—Two hundred more."

Hudibras, part 3. cant. 1. v. 1277.

The praise indeed of using it gravely belongs wholly to yourself.

the

the British empire was so "*embarrassed with contention and difficulties*" in Parliament before the prevalence of Influence as to be prejudicial to the Nation? And what measure of national good, since its introduction among us, it is probable would have miscarried, had not this Influence been applied? Yet any one unacquainted with the history of Parliamentary proceedings, must imagine, from the gloomy picture which you paint of "*embarrassments, endless contentions and difficulties*" that an independent Parliament had proved one of the severest visitations of Providence. We should search in vain to find passages of Armies lost, of Commerce harassed, of Cultivation blasted, and of Famine occasioned, or of the Empire dismembered, by the "*adverse disposition of Parliament to the recommendation of the Crown.*" At this stage, verging toward a conclusion, I stay not to enquire whether Armies have been lost, Commerce has been harassed, the Empire dismembered, or Famine occasioned, by the facile ductility of temper, characteristic of modern Parliaments.

I was apt to believe that the more strictly the legislative, executive, and judiciary offices were kept apart, the better were their respective faculties administered. The last exercise of the royal Negative was, I believe, on a Place-bill. Your fears contain the first excuse I have seen for WILLIAM'S ungracious refusal of his assent; and till I met with your work, I was unapprized of the debt of gratitude due to our Upper House for their regular rejection

of the Place-bills since sent to them by the Commons. Had these Bills passed into laws, they must have checked the accumulation of jarring functions and discordant powers on one head. But then we could not have prevented this confusion of public authorities without the *bazard* of rendering Parliaments independent!—A Representor of the People, too anxious for their welfare to subscribe his belief in the monstrous doctrine started by influenced Parliaments, the doctrine of CONFIDENCE in Ministers, and inheriting that honourable jealousy of the executive Government to which we owe every thing that is dear, will entertain a more enlarged opinion of the obligations of his trust. He will not feel your solicitude for the “*ease and conveniency*” of public officers, when set in competition with that vigilant circumspection he knows it to be his bounden duty to exert. Habituated to severe attention, and strenuous in remonstrance where the occasion requires, there will not, I say, Sir, in a well-informed and faithful Representative exist your tender interest for “*the ease and conveniency*” of the stipendiary administrators of the executive Government. Every other consideration will with him be subordinate to the *salus Reipublicæ*. He will require his conscience to be informed before he can ratify any ministerial measure by his vote. He will remember and apply to your remark, what the celebrated Commentator on our Laws has left on record, lest infractions of the TRIAL BY JURY should ever pass unheeded—“That the
“Liberties

“ Liberties of England cannot but subsist so long as
 “ this Palladium remains sacred and inviolate; not
 “ only from all open attacks, which none will be so
 “ hardy as to make, but also from all secret ma-
 “ chinations which may sap and undermine it; and
 “ however *convenient* these may appear at first, as
 “ doubtless ALL ARBITRARY POWERS WELL-EXE-
 “ CUTED ARE THE MOST CONVENIENT, yet let it
 “ again be remembered that *delays and little incon-*
 “ *veniencies are the price that all free Nations must pay*
 “ *for their Liberty in more substantial matters*; and that
 “ these inroads upon the sacred bulwark of the
 “ Nation are fundamentally opposite to the spirit of
 “ our Constitution.” BLACKSTONE; *b. 4. ch. 27.*—
 Under despotic Governments we well know “ *the*
 “ *ease and conveniency*” of those in power outweighs
 all regard to public utility. But the English Nation
 will, I trust, ever assert their Government to have
 been instituted for the People’s sake, and that there-
 fore *their* collective “ *ease and conveniency*,” not that
 of Ministers, ought to be the sole rule and fixed
 principle of their Representatives *.—I do not suspect
 you

* BOLINGBROKE has anticipated and set aside your plea of
 “ *conveniency*” so happily that I cannot refrain from another
 quotation. “ Must all the forms (he asks) instituted to preserve
 “ the checks and controls of the several parts of the Constitution
 “ on one another, and necessary by consequence to preserve the liberty
 “ of the whole, be abandoned, and a free Constitution be de-
 “ stroyed, for the sake of some little *conveniency*, or expe-
 “ diency the more, in the administration of public affairs? &c.—In
 “ short, we must make our option, and surely this option is not

you to prefer the slavish acquiescence and profound mystery of a Turkish Divan to the Freedom of *Speech*, and the open Debates of an English Parliament. You only misconceive the animation of the loud language of Liberty :

“ What tho’ among ourselves with too much heat
 “ We sometimes wrangle, when we should debate ;
 “ A consequential ill which Freedom draws ;
 “ A bad effect, but from a noble cause.”——

“ Nor is it (you continue) a conclusion *founded*
 “ *in justice or experience* ! that, because men are in-
 “ duced by views of interest to yield their consent
 “ or support to measures, concerning which their
 “ judgment decides nothing, they may be brought
 “ by the same Influence to act in deliberate op-
 “ position to knowlege and duty.” p. 495.

The Influence you advocate is not an “ *Influence*
 “ *which will bring men to act in deliberate opposition to*
 “ *knowlege and duty*” ! You must then have for-
 gotten, or hoped that your readers would forget,
 that “ *sure and commanding Influence of which the Con-*
 “ *stitution, it seems, is totally ignorant, growing out of*
 “ *that enormous patronage, which the increased extent*

“ hard to be made, between the real and permanent blessings
 “ of Liberty, diffused thro’ a whole nation, and the fantastic
 “ and accidental advantages, *which they who govern, not the*
 “ body of the People, enjoy under absolute Monarchies.”

Dissert. on Parties. Let. 11.

“ and

"and opulence of the empire has placed in the disposal of the Executive Magistrate." p. 466.

In good faith, do you suppose that those would not *"act in deliberate opposition to knowlege and duty,"* whom you esteem dead to all the compunctions of shame—as so little regarding the national welfare, that, if not influenced by *"views of interest,"* they would *"at least obstruct the conduct of public affairs by a wanton and perverse opposition?"* As if men so abandoned as to make a merchandize of their Parliamentary trust could be struck with remorse, and shrink from any project they were ordered to support. No, Sir. Put no man's interest in the balance against his duty, is the deduction from *"experience."* In a struggle between duty and self-interest, it is not uncharitable to apprehend that the latter will triumph. When BACON professed *not to sell injustice, but never to let Justice go scotfree,* he compromised with his duty under the semblance of a pliant Morality, precisely the same as you here tolerate—he would not for lucre do that which was wrong in the exercise of his judiciary functions, nor what was right without that sort of *"Influence which results from the acceptance or expectation"* of personal recompence. No doubt too he flattered himself he could never be *"brought to act in deliberate opposition to knowlege and duty."* He remains a perpetual warning that if we capitulate with interest by a natural progression it is sure to overpower the strongest resolutions.—
"The wisest of mankind" descended from the

Judgment-Seat with ignominy, convicted of foul corruption*.

It is certainly unsafe, perhaps it is unjust, to place any one between temptation on the one hand, and moral obligation on the other. In the summary ordinances of MOSES to the "Judges and Officers" of the Israelites, his most pointed injunction is against their "taking a gift." Directly contrary to your opinion, "a gift (says the inspired Law-giver) doth "blind the eyes of the wise, and pervert the words "of the righteous." (*Exodus. ch. 28. v. 8. and Deut. ch. 16. v. 19.*) Perhaps it is scarcely decorous to remind you that this restraint was laid on rulers elected by the People, and under a Theocracy.

In your general principle, that the *private vice* of a Legislator acting on the sordid motive of pecuniary interest is a *public benefit*, you vie with MANDEVILLE; and, like MANDEVILLE, you would qualify your system by setting bounds to the practice. [App. X.] But, to recur to the melancholy "*experience*" of the age in which we live in opposition to the chimerical refinements, and idle distinctions you attempt. Mark how plainly Mr. DUNNING (Lord ASHBURTON) puts you down. Harken to this powerful speaker and constitutional Lawyer, where he says, that "nothing less than the most alarming and "corrupt Influence, could induce a number of Gentlemen

* Της δὲ Δίκης ῥοδὸς εὐχομένης ἢ κ' ἀνδρὲς ἀγῶσι
ΔΩΡΟΦΑΓΟΙ, σχολιαὶς δὲ δίκαις κρινῶσι θεμιστάς.

ἩΣΙΟΔΟΥ Ἔργα καὶ Ἡμέραι.

“ in that House, to support the Minister by their Votes
 “ in those measures within doors, WHICH THEY CON-
 “ DEMNED AND REPROBATED WITHOUT. *That this*
 “ *was the case, and within his own immediate knowlege,*
 “ *he declared upon his honour ;* and added, that tho’
 “ he was not himself very squeamish, nor over-
 “ delicate, in giving his opinion upon the measures
 “ of Administration, *he had never indulged himself in*
 “ *throwing upon them such severe epithets, as had fallen*
 “ *in his presence from the mouths of Members abroad,*
 “ *who notwithstanding* SUPPORTED THEM WITHIN
 “ THESE WALLS !! Nor was the number small, for,
 “ but that the task would be too invidious, *he could*
 “ *mention no less than FIFTY Members of that House who*
 “ *had held that language and conduct.*”—See *Parlia-*
mentary Debates, April 6, 1780.

They who are not stricken dumb by this assevera-
 tion of the numbers within one man’s knowlege “ who
 “ dare think one thing, and another *vote*,” * have to
 solve a vexatious problem. *How* in the signal case
 of the Middlesex Election, Mr. WILKES, four times
 chosen, was as often expelled by the House, who at
 last seated a Gentleman of *their* choice in the place

* “ You would not expect to hear any *lax, fashionable, tem-*
 “ *porizing principles of Morality* from the Pulpit. Alas ! let us
 “ speak as plainly as we can, we have no great expectations of
 “ being regarded ; it is the last stage of political profligacy
 “ *when men condemn in private, condemn in unequivocal terms, and*
 “ *without a blush, the very principles which they support in public.*”

Sermons and Tracts, by R. WATSON, Bishop of Landaff. p. 122.

of the Candidate elected by the Freeholders? Their task will not end here. The sticklers for "*the Influence arising from the acceptance or expectation of public preferments,*" have further to develope, how the same and succeeding Houses, though pressed every Session to wipe away this blot from the Journals of Parliament, negatived all Motions with that purport, till Lord NORTH, who auspicated this expulsion had been displaced? Then the change of Ministry effected a sudden change in the minds of the House of Commons. To what latent cause are we to ascribe this revolution in their sentiments? Are we bound to suppose that by a blind and irresistible fatality these unnatural Majorities were robbed of free-agency, and degraded to involuntary instruments to execute what others had devised? Or may we ask, whether the secret workings of a corrupt ascendancy through "*the acceptance and expectation of public preferments*" did not INFLUENCE them, and "*in deliberate opposition to knowledge and duty,*" to do a deed "*subversive of the rights of the whole body of Electors in the kingdom?*"* And to persist just so many years in their refusal to cancel this alarming precedent as that Ministerial Influence continued, which instigated the opprobrious Resolution?

* 3d May, 1782. "It was resolved that all the Declarations, Orders, and Resolutions respecting the Election of John Wilkes, Esq. for the County of Middlesex, as a void Election, &c. be expunged from the Journals of this House as "*subversive of the rights of the whole body of Electors of the Kingdom.*"

At

At length we are arrived at your courtly corollary, which by the perplexity and ambiguity of expression we may collect, envelopes more meaning than is avowed. You admonish us to “reflect upon the power of the House of Commons to extort a compliance with its resolutions from the other parts of the Legislature, or to put to *death the Constitution by a refusal of the annual grants of money* to the support of the necessary functions of Government —when we reflect, also, what motives there are, which, in the vicissitudes of political interests and passions, *may one day arm and point this power against the Executive Magistrate—* when we attend to these considerations, we shall be led *perhaps* to acknowledge, that *there is not more of paradox than of probability*, in that important, but much decried apothegm, *that an independent Parliament is incompatible with the existence of the Monarchy.*” p. 496. True it is, Sir, the House of Commons have in theory the power to withhold “*the annual grants of money.*” But this power now rests merely *in scriptis*. Of what avail is a right which they may continue to claim, but can never exercise? To this *artificial* reasoning, not unlike the technical fictions which disgrace the *letter* of our Law, it is enough for my present purpose to repeat that “the Supplies they must vote, for the Army must have its pay, and the Public Creditors their interest.” [App. Y.] More might be said to allay your fears on this score, but I hasten to ask you if this can be the self-same body, which,

when it suited, you described as fallen into a state so abject and so weak, that prudence forbade them to shake off the interference of the Peers in their Elections? They must submit passively to this abuse, "*to help to keep the Government of the country*" in their hands; in which you were pleased to add, "*it would not perhaps long continue to reside, if so powerful and wealthy a part of the Nation as the Peerage compose, were excluded from all share and interest in its constitution.*"—

That all may comprehend the more clearly its general aspect, let me detain you while I sketch a parting view of your performance.—Had you spoken out roundly, and declared that to intrust any powers to the People's House, other than to regulate an inclosure-bill, or a road-act, were highly dangerous to the common safety, if not counter-acted by the Influence of the Crown; however the doctrine would have outraged our countrymen, at any rate you might have lain claim to the merit of publishing sentiments of which you were not ashamed. But to contend, that, to the neglect of a free choice, it is better for "*HALF of the House of Commons to obtain their Seats by purchase or nomination*"—To assert that if men with specious qualifications be returned, "*it signifies little who return them*"—To enquire whether "*any new scheme promise to collect more wisdom and integrity*"—To defend the Peers in their interference in the Election of the Commons—To ask, "*where would be the inconveniency if the King should nominate a limited number*"—To have doubted whether any endeavour to diminish the Influence

fluence of the Crown "*be good or even INNOCENT*"—To suppose the Commons atrocious enough, unless gained by private and particular interest, "*to obstruct the conduct of public affairs by a wanton and perverse opposition*"—To leave us only the choice between a "*Government of terror,*" or a "*Government by Influence*"—To pronounce the national business so complex that in general it is "*indifferent*" to Members on which side they vote—To declare, "*experience*" teaches that interest will not make men "*act in opposition to knowledge and duty*"—To crown the whole with an "*apothegm*" that "*an independent Parliament is incompatible with Monarchy.*"—And to hold out this tissue of libellous inuendoes on the cardinal principles of the English Constitution, not more our honest pride than the common topic of praise among foreigners, in order to raise doubts and difficulties concerning their excellency, and that on no better ground than a remote and improbable possibility—This wild surmise, which at last you can only venture to call a "*probability*" of what "*may one day*" happen—that a fair and uninfluenced Representative of the Commons may "*put to death the Constitution*"—is surely premeditated equivocation—Yes, I must call it dishonourable duplicity. This tameness deceives our expectation. Why falter? Obviously your context demands a bolder climax.

I have an heavier charge against you. Your project to fence the Constitution against popular excess, by encircling the Throne with a regulated
conflux

conflux of Influence—that is, to open the flood-gates of Corruption, hoping to shut them again when the baleful tide flows to a given height in Parliament—is a libel on a Constitution compounded like ours, of three INDEPENDENT Estates. “The integrity,” according to Mr. PALEY, “which depends on the FREEDOM AND INDEPENDENCY OF PARLIAMENT, is the key-stone which keeps the whole together” no longer. Now Influence cements our social edifice. Touch this talisman, and the baseless fabric dissolves. All the encomiums on the happy assemblage of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy, in the English scheme of Parliamentary Legislation are then no more than the waking dreams of theorists! Illuminated men throughout Europe, the MONTESQUIEUS and the BURLAMAQUIS, have in vain exhausted their talents to praise this triple division and balance of powers, which, by a free action of all its parts, gives reciprocal solidity to each branch, while, by a rare felicity, it combines monarchical energy with the mild and equal maxims of a Commonwealth. You forebode that a free Parliament and the regal office could not co-exist. Yet if “*the body of the British People be satisfied with their condition*” (as you have more recently told us*) how come you to fear that an Assembly of *their* Delegates, voluntarily chosen to speak *their* voice, and to defend *their* interests, would prove “*incompatible with the existence of the Monarchy?*”

* In the Advertisement to the separate publication of this Chapter on the British Constitution.

Every whisper of this kind implies, necessarily implies, one of these two things—either that Public Opinion is weary of kingly Government, or that the Crown and the Commons' House are natural antagonists. Extricate yourself out of this unfortunate dilemma. Let me add, without offence, that I suspect this corollary to your political lucubrations would have been spared, had it not been to work on our tried attachment to Royalty, in the hope to fright us from Constitutional Reform. At least you must wish it to be suppressed after you are shown its express Parliamentary reprobation, even in the decay of modern Representation. This was, Sir, during a transient suspension of Influence, when the House of Commons, recovering its proper tone, declared in an address to the Throne, that “a King of Great Britain cannot have so perfect, [n] or so honour-
 “able a security for every thing which can make a
 “King truly great, and truly happy, as *in the*
 “*genuine and natural support of an UNINFLUENCED*
 “AND INDEPENDENT HOUSE OF COMMONS.” *

Lastly: from your conjectural objections (they are nothing more) built on a “*probability*” of what “*may one day*” happen from an outrageous abuse of power by a popular Assembly, but in proof of which you are as unable to intimate a single indication, as you are to exhibit a satisfactory precedent, let us appeal to an infallible test. To these speculative predictions I will oppose plain matter of fact, the unvaried and collective evidence of different

* 15 Ap. 1782. Jour. Com. v. 38. p. 923.

ages, and of many countries. An accumulation of testimony equivalent to demonstration: and, unless you were able to draw up a counter-catalogue, equally impressive, every “unplaced, unpensioned,” *uninfluenced* Englishman, must invert your servile “*apothegm*” to affirm that A DEPENDENT PARLIAMENT IS INCOMPATIBLE WITH THE EXISTENCE OF A FREE CONSTITUTION. For, let the English People weigh well in their minds that the Romans were deprived of Freedom by the abasement of the Senate—that the antient States General of France were reduced to a nullity by the sway which a tyrant gained over them—that the political profligacy of the Swedish Diet deteriorated an elective and limited Monarchy into one hereditary and absolute—that the Cortes of the various provinces of Spain composed the most independent and most respectable Assemblies that Europe had then seen, till the precious ores of Peru and Mexico, tempted them to subvert the Liberties of their country. Nor let us forget the fate of the States of Hungary and Bohemia; nor that in the Electorates and other Co-Estates of the Empire, scarcely a vestige remains of their antient popular institutions—all are superseded by a MILITARY DESPOTISM. Furthermore, let us bear uppermost with our remembrance of these afflicting examples, that these Nations, humbled by slavery, lost their importance in the proportion that they lost their Freedom.

To pass over the rest, Spain, heretofore the scourge and terror of Europe, eminently blessed by
nature

nature with the eternal advantages of situation and climate, and annually supplied with sterling treasure from the American Continent, has, since that fatal reverse, dwindled to an adversary too feeble to crush the corsairs of Barbary. What series of calamity, arising from the People enjoying their rights, have you to set off against this monitory recital of enslaved millions, where the legislative Body corrupted by the executive Magistrate, in alliance indeed in most cases with intriguing Priests, has betrayed to a Tyrant the Liberties it was especially chosen to vindicate? The Prince grasps the solid substance of arbitrary power, and nothing is left to the Subject except the pageant of Freedom. I deny not that the "unreal mockery" of a Senate, a Parliament, a Diet, the Cortes, or the States, has been generally kept up, at least for a time, because perverted into an instrument truly formidable to the People. The preservation of forms conceals the progression toward despotism. Despotism is a spectre too hideous to gain admittance among free-born men, unless it be introduced under a borrowed mask. History had evinced it to have been no mean policy in the Cæsars, long after their will was taken for the only law, to retain the external form and image of the Republic. *Eadem magistratum vocabula, sua consulibus, sua prætoribus species.* It is not in religious establishments only that "the NAME" *is commonly the last thing that is changed.*" * Hence

* PALEY, p. 580.

it is, and the fact deserves our most serious regards, that the Sicilians, exhausted and gasping under Spanish oppression, are still insulted with the solemn grimace of the PARLIAMENT, founded by their Norman ancestors. [App. Z.] But we need not to look abroad in quest of instances. *They may be found at home.*—Your own Houses of Convocation, Sir, once the rivals of Parliament, are still, after the idle formality of Elections, to represent the Clergy, hung out on every General Election, to warn Englishmen how long the lifeless corse of an institution may remain entire after its spirit is departed.

APPENDIX.

Note A. referred to from p. 6.

AN adequate and free Representation of the People, suited to the existing state of society, is the life-spring and master-principle of freedom in our Constitution—]

Other writers might be adduced in proof of this point; but on this occasion I prefer Bishop HURD's testimony. Mr. PALEY and his admirers will more readily submit to episcopal authority.

“ In process of time, the lesser military tenants
 “ in *capite* multiplied exceedingly. And, as many
 “ of them were poor, and unequal to a personal
 “ attendance in the court of their lord, or in the
 “ common council of the kingdom (where of right
 “ and duty they were to pay their attendance) they
 “ were willing, and it was found convenient, to
 “ give them leave to appear in the way of *Represent-*
 “ *tation*. And this was the origin of what we now
 “ call the Knights of the Shires; who, in those
 “ times, were appointed to represent, not all the
 “ Freeholders of Counties, but the lesser tenants

“ of the Crown only. For these, not attending in
 “ person, would otherwise have had no place in the
 “ King’s council.

“ The rise of Citizens and Burgeffes, that is,
 “ Representatives of the Cities and trading Towns,
 “ must be accounted for somewhat differently. These
 “ had originally been in the jurisdiction, and made
 “ part of the demesnes of the King and his great
 “ Lords. The reason of which appears from what
 “ I observed of the genius of the feudal policy.
 “ For, little account being had of any but martial
 “ men, and trade being not only dishonourable, but
 “ almost unknown in those ages ; the lower people,
 “ who lived together in towns, most of them small
 “ and inconsiderable, were left in a state of subjec-
 “ tion to the Crown, or some other of the Barons,
 “ and exposed to their arbitrary impositions and
 “ talliages.

“ But this condition of Burghers, as it sprang
 “ from the military genius of the nation, could only
 “ be supported by it. When that declined there-
 “ fore, and instead of a People of soldiers, the
 “ commercial spirit prevailed, and filled our towns
 “ with rich traders and merchants, it was no longer
 “ reasonable, nor was it the interest of the Crown,
 “ that these communities and bodies of men should
 “ be so little regarded. On the contrary, *a large*
 “ *share of the public burdens being laid upon them,* and
 “ the frequent necessities of the Crown, especially
 “ in foreign wars, or in the King’s contentions with
 “ his Barons, *requiring him to have recourse to their*
 “ *purses,*

" *purfes, it was naturally brought about that thofe, as*
 " *well as the tenants in capite, fhould in time be admitted*
 " *to have a fhare in the public councils.*"—*Moral and Po-*
litical Dialogues, by the Rev. Dr. HURD. v. 2. p. 156.
5th Edit.

" The Constitution itfelf fupposed the men of
 " greateft confequence in the Common-wealth to
 " have a feat in the national councils. Trade and
 " agriculture had advanced vaft numbers into con-
 " fequence, that before were of fmall account in
 " the kingdom. The public confideration was in-
 " creafed by their wealth, and the public neceffities
 " relieved by it. Were thefe to remain for ever
 " excluded from the King's councils? *or was not*
 " *that council, which had Liberty for its object, to widen*
 " *and expand itfelf in order to receive them?* It did,
 " in fact, receive them with open arms; and, in fo
 " doing, conducted itfelf on the very principles of
 " the old feudal policy." *ib. p. 166.*

Note B. referred to from the note in p. 6.

The emiffary of a Tartar Mahometan Prince has pur-
chafed not lefs than EIGHT SEATS among the Commons
of Great Britain.—] Of this fact there can be no
 doubt. Mr. PITT, when he brought forward his
 firft Motion in favour of a Parliamentary Reform,
 did not fcruple to affert it in the Houfe. " Another
 " fet (he faid) of Boroughs and Towns, in the lofty
 " poffeffion of Englifh Freedom, *claimed to them-*

“ *selves the right of bringing their Votes to market.*
 “ They had no other property, no other stake in
 “ the country, than the property and price which
 “ they procured for their votes. Such Boroughs
 “ were the most dangerous of all others. So far
 “ from consulting the interest of their country, in
 “ the choice which they made, they held out their
 “ Boroughs to the best purchaser, and *in fact they*
 “ *belonged more to the NABOB OF ARCOT than they*
 “ *did to the People of Great Britain.* They were Cities
 “ and Boroughs more within the jurisdiction of the Car-
 “ natic than the limits of the Empire of Great Britain;
 “ and it was a fact pretty well known and generally
 “ understood, that the Nabob of Arcot had no less than
 “ SEVEN or EIGHT MEMBERS in that House! Such
 “ Boroughs then were sources of corruption; they
 “ gave rise to an inundation of corrupt wealth and
 “ corrupt Members, who had no regard or connec-
 “ tion either for or with the People of this king-
 “ dom,” &c. &c.—*Debrett's Parliamentary Register,*
 v. 24. p. 124.

Mr. BURKE also harangues indignantly on this
 abuse.—“ Our wonderful Minister, as you all know,
 “ formed a new plan, a plan *insigne recens alio in-*
 “ *dictum ore*, a plan for supporting the freedom of our
 “ Constitution by court intrigues, and for removing
 “ its corruptions by Indian delinquency. To carry
 “ that bold paradoxical design into execution, suffi-
 “ cient funds and apt instruments became necessary.
 “ You are perfectly sensible that a Parliamentary
 “ Reform occupies his thoughts day and night, as

“ an essential member in this extraordinary project.
 “ In his anxious researches upon this subject, natura-
 “ instinct, as well as sound policy, would direct his
 “ eyes, and settle his choice on PAUL BENFIELD.
 “ PAUL BENFIELD is the grand Parliamentary Re-
 “ former, the Reformer to whom the whole choir of
 “ Reformers bow, and to whom even the right ho-
 “ nourable gentleman [Mr. PITT] himself must
 “ yield the palm: For what region in the empire,
 “ what City, what Borough, what County, what
 “ tribunal in this kingdom, is not full of his la-
 “ bours? others have been only speculators; he is
 “ the grand practical Reformer; and while the
 “ Chancellor of the Exchequer pledges in vain “ *the*
 “ *man and the minister,*” to increase the provincial
 “ Members, Mr. Benfield has auspiciously and prac-
 “ tically begun it. Leaving far behind him even
 “ Lord *Camelford*’s generous design of bestowing
 “ *Old Sarum* on the Bank of England, Mr. Ben-
 “ field has thrown in the Borough of CRICKLADE
 “ to reinforce the County Representation. Not
 “ content with this, in order to station a steady
 “ phalanx for all future Reforms, this public-spirited
 “ usurer, amid his charitable toils for the relief of
 “ India, did not forget the *poor rotten Constitution* of
 “ his native country. For her, he did not disdain
 “ to stoop to the trade of a wholesale upholsterer
 “ for this House, to furnish it, not with the faded
 “ tapestry figures of antiquated merit, such as
 “ decorate, and may reproach some other houses,
 “ but with real, solid, living patterns of true

“ modern virtue. *Paul Benfield made (reckoning himself) no fewer than EIGHT Members in the last Parliament.* What copious streams of pure blood must he not have transfused into the veins of the present!”—*Works*, v. 2. p. 511.

Indeed, Mr. BURKE, commenting on the Nabob of Arcott's private debts to Europeans being charged on the revenues of the Carnatic, in the same Speech hesitates not to impute that extraordinary transaction to the Parliamentary interest of the Creditors in these glowing words—“ Let no man hereafter talk of the
“ decaying energies of nature. All the acts and monuments in the records of *peculation*; the consolidated
“ corruption of ages; the patterns of exemplary
“ plunder in the heroic times of Roman iniquity,
“ never equalled the gigantic corruption of this
“ single act. Never did Nero, in all the insolent
“ prodigality of despotism, deal out to his prætorian
“ guards a donation fit to be named with the largesse
“ showered down by the bounty of our Chancellor
“ of the Exchequer [Mr. PITT] *on the faithful band*
“ *of his Indian Sepoys.*”

Both Mr. BURKE and Mr. PITT possessed peculiar means of information respecting the number of Members put into Parliament by the Nabob of Arcot or his agent. Mr. BURKE's Brother (Mr. R. BURKE) in an Election cause where Mr. PITT was the junior Council, took occasion in addressing the Jury to remark, “ that the whole West of England
“ were anxious to see Mr. BENFIELD, and to partake
“ of his liberality. That each Borough was de-
“ *firous*

“ firous of having him for their Representative ; but
 “ his person could not be divided. That into
 “ Cricklade pouring the riches of the East she soon
 “ fell a victim, and that Borough he fixed on himself
 “ to represent. That in the other Boroughs he had
 “ his substitutes, and NINE of those substitutes, he then
 “ had in the House of Commons” !!—*Report of the
 Cricklade Case.* p. 312.

Note C. referred to from p. 10.

“ *The rotten part of our Constitution, the small
 Boroughs*”—] The passage in BURNET is as fol-
 lows :—“ Most of the great Counties and the chief
 “ Cities chose men that were zealous for the King and
 “ Government : but *the rotten part of our Constitution,*
 “ *the small Boroughs,* were in many places wrought
 “ on to choose bad men.” *Hist. of his own Time.*
 v. 2. p. 295. fol. 1734.

Note D. referred to from p. 22.

—*as the constitutional principle of free and popular Elec-
 tion demands.*] “ If the King doth newly incor-
 “ porate an antient Borough (which sent Burgesses
 “ to the Parliament) and granteth that certain
 “ selected Burgesses shall make Election of the Bur-
 “ gesses of Parliament, where all the Burgesses
 “ elected

“ elected before, this Charter taketh not the Elec-
 “ tion of the other Burgesſes. And ſo, if a City, &c.
 “ hath power to make Ordinances, they cannot
 “ make an Ordinance that a leſſe number ſhall elect
 “ Burgeſſes for the Parliament than made the Elec-
 “ tion before; *for free Elections of Members of the*
 “ *Higb Court of Parliament are pro bono publico,*
 “ and not to be compared to other caſes of Election
 “ of Maiors, Bailiffs, &c. of Corporations.”

COKE. 4 Inſt. 48.

“ In moſt parlements where I have ſerved thirty
 “ years together, whenſoever any queſtion came
 “ about the freedome of elections, I have obſerved
 “ *the inclination of the houſe of commons to favour*
 “ *the popular elections,* judging the more free and
 “ indifferent the election is, the more it is for the
 “ freedome and intereſt of the commons; whereof
 “ many precedents and judgments are in the jour-
 “ nals of that houſe: and before the ſtatute 8 H. 6.
 “ which reſtrains elections to be by freeholders of
 “ 40 ſhillings per annum only, all the freeholders
 “ generally had their votes in thoſe elections; and
 “ att this day in antient cittys and boroughs, for the
 “ moſt part the elections ſtill remaine popular and
 “ free by all the inhabitants, except almes men and
 “ ſuch like.”—WHITELOCKE’S *Notes uppon the King’s*
Writt for chooſing Members of Parliament. v. 1. p. 385.

Note

Note E. referred to from p. 23.

Your Law vaunts that Englishmen act in Legislation
"either in person or by Representation upon their own
"free Elections."] This constitutional principle is
 to be found in the Parliamentary recognition of the
 descent of the Crown of England to JAMES, on the de-
 mise of ELIZABETH. "As we cannot too often, or
 " enough, so can there be no means or ways so fit,
 " both to sacrifice our unfeigned and hearty thanks to
 " Almighty God, for blessing us with a Sovereign
 " adorned with the rarest gifts of mind and body, in
 " such admirable peace and quietness, and upon the
 " knees of our hearts to agnize our most constant
 " faith, obedience, and loyalty to your Majesty and
 " your royal progeny, as in this High Court of Par-
 " liament, *where all the whole body of the Realm,*
 " *and every particular member thereof, either in Person*
 " *or by Representation* (UPON THEIR OWN FREE
 " ELECTIONS) are by the Laws of this Realm
 " deemed to be personally present." Stat. 1 Jac. 1. c. 1.

The introductory nonsense is amply compensated
 by this statutory declaration of the original and com-
 mon right of Englishmen. It is declaratory of the
 Common Law; as will appear by the succeeding
 extract from Sir Tho. SMYTH's curious tract on the
 "manner of Gouvernement or policie of the Realme
 "of Englande." This Gentleman, Secretary to
 EDWARD and ELIZABETH, says, "Euerie English-
 "man is entended to bee there [in Parliament]
 "present,

“ present, either in person or by procuration and
 “ attornies, of what preheminance, state, dignitie,
 “ or qualities soeuer he be, from the Prince (be he
 “ King or Queene.) to the lowest person of Englande.
 “ And the consent of the Parliament is taken to be
 “ euerie mans consent.” *De Republica Anglorum.*
 1583. p. 35.

The same doctrine is recognized by Mr. Justice
 BLACKSTONE.—“ The Commons consist of all such
 “ men of property in the kingdom, as have not
 “ Seats in the House of Lords: *every one of which*
 “ *has a voice in Parliament, either personally or by his*
 “ *Representatives.* In a free State every man, who
 “ is supposed a free agent, ought to be in some
 “ measure his own governor; and therefore *a branch*
 “ *at least of the legislative power should reside in the*
 “ *whole body of the People.*”—*Commentaries on the*
Laws of England. v. 1. p. 158. 8vo.

Note F. referred to from p. 23.

—*outnumber the Constituents of a Majority of your lower*
House of Legislature.] After the extracts in the Note
 immediately preceding, the following statement can-
 not but fill every honest mind with scandal.—“ Your
 “ Committee find that *two hundred and fifty-seven*
 “ *Members, being a Majority of the Commons of*
 “ *England, are elected by eleven thousand and seventy-*
 “ *five voters; or in other words, by little more than*
 “ the

“ the *one hundred and seventieth part* of the People to
 “ be represented, even supposing them to be only *two*
 “ *millions.*”—*Report of the Committee of THE FRIENDS*
OF THE PEOPLE on the Representation of England
and Wales. p. 5. 4to. *printed by order of the Society.*—
 Scottish Representation lies in a state yet more de-
 plorable.—“ In two of the Counties, there are only
 “ *three* real Voters in each; in seven not more than
 “ *ten*: in all of them respectively very few. The
 “ total number of real Voters in the whole Kingdom
 “ is *one thousand three hundred and ninety.*”—*Report*
of the Representation of Scotland, published by the same
 Society, p. 8. 4to.

Note G. referred to from p. 23.

Perpetuities and Reversions of Seats among your Re-
presentatives are advertized for sale by auction as pub-
licly as seats at your Theatres.] Within these few
 years the perpetuity of nominating *two* Members for
 Gatton, and a reversion in fee to nominate *one* for
 Ashburton, have been openly advertized and sold by
 auction. These anecdotes will form no uninteresting
 part in the history of Parliament, and should be
 preserved.

“ A MOST VALUABLE CONTINGENCY.

“ Yesterday the spirit and purity of the English
 “ Constitution was demonstrated in a very remark-
 “ able

“ able manner. The estate of GATTON was sold by
 “ auction, and the value of the estate was enhanced
 “ by a public declaration, that beside the rental, the
 “ mansions, the parks, the water, and so forth, it
 “ possessed *most valuable Contingencies*, which Mr.
 “ CHRISTIE said, tho’ they were of a nature too de-
 “ licate for him to mention, they were too palpable
 “ to be overlooked.

“ The contingency is, that *tho’ there be three or*
 “ *four miserable hamlets on the estate, lett at no more*
 “ *than forty shillings a year rent, or thereabout, it sends*
 “ *two Members to Parliament.* This contingency,
 “ which is valuable only on account of the cor-
 “ ruption of the day in which we live, has advanced
 “ this estate beyond all credible estimate ; and made
 “ it, for a certain class of men, one of the most de-
 “ sirable purchases in England. The rental is only
 “ fifteen hundred pounds a year, and therefore by
 “ the disproportioned size of the mansions, parks,
 “ and offices, it can only be considered as a country
 “ villa.

“ This villa was yesterday peremptorily sold at
 “ the hammer for sixty-two thousand guineas !—and
 “ this sum was considered as so egregiously beneath
 “ the value, that Mr. CHRISTIE held it for a very
 “ considerable time in suspense, before he would
 “ suffer it to go at that sum.—

“ We must bear testimony to the able and masterly
 “ manner in which Mr. CHRISTIE managed this
 “ subject. He hinted at the contingency with great
 “ nicety—He said that in three years an occasion
 “ would

“ would come when the astonishing importance of
 “ this estate would be felt—It was too conspicuous to
 “ require comment—His eye traversed the room for
 “ *Nabobs*. He hinted at inquiries and Impeach-
 “ ments—looked first to the Boroughmongers of
 “ one party, and then of another—He squinted at all
 “ the possible contingencies of political convul-
 “ sion—and as an apology for dwelling on the in-
 “ adequate sum of sixty-two thousand guineas, he
 “ begged the audience to reflect on a moment what
 “ must be the reflection thrown upon him three
 “ years hence, if he should suffer it now to go at
 “ that sum. “ What should I do (says he) three
 “ years hence, when, on the true value of this in-
 “ estimable purchase being known, it should sell for
 “ twenty or thirty thousand pounds more than the
 “ present sum? What must I do in this case? Why
 “ pulverize my hammer, and forswear for eternity
 “ a profession for which I should be proved demon-
 “ stratively unfit!” It was at length knocked down
 “ to old Joshua Sharp, who was said to buy it for
 “ the Earl of Hertford. Edward Moore, Esq; bid
 “ sixty-one thousand guineas. Mr. Sharpe offered
 “ another thousand, and made the purchase.

“ We forbear to comment on this subject. But
 “ surely, in the ensuing Session this circumstance
 “ will justify the arguments of Mr. Fox and Mr.
 “ PITT, and convince Parliament, if reasoning can
 “ convince them, of the necessity that there is for
 “ a Reform in the Representation of the People.”

GAZETTEER; September 8th, 1786.

“ Devon-

“ Devonshire.

“ To be peremptorily sold,

By Mr. Christie,

“ At his Great Room in Pall Mall, on Wednesday

“ the 7th of February next, at one o'clock,

“ The reversion in fee, subject to two lives, a
“ moiety of the Lordship, &c. &c. of ASHBURTON
“ in the county of Devon, together with the Court
“ Baron, Court Leet, and Perquisites thereto be-
“ longing, and the Rents payable by the Free or
“ Burgage Tenants, in number one hundred and
“ sixty-three of the annual amount of twenty-two
“ pounds and upward : the above comprehends

“ *A most valuable Contingency*

“ *of a desirable nature, requiring no comment.*

“ Printed particulars may be now had at the White
“ Lyon Inn, Bristol; York House, Bath; White
“ Hart, and Antelope, Salisbury; the Rainbow
“ Coffee-house, Cornhill; and in Pall Mall.”

GAZETTEER; January 8th, 1787.

Note H. referred to from p. 31.

*This Identity of Interest is to be attained by a partici-
pation of the People in their own Government—]* “ He
“ that would know whether absolute Monarchys or
“ mix'd

" mix'd Governments do most foment or punish
 " Venality and Corruption, ought to examine the
 " principle and practice of both, and compare them
 " one with the other. As to the Principle, the
 " above mentioned Vices may be profitable to pri-
 " vate men, but they can never be so to the
 " Government, if it be popular or mix'd: No
 " People was ever the better for that which renders
 " them weak or base; and *a DULY CREATED Ma-*
 " *gistracy, governing a Nation with their consent, can*
 " *have no interest distinct from that of the Publick,*
 " or desire to diminish the strength of the People,
 " which is their own, and by which they subsist.
 " On the other side, the absolute Monarch who
 " governs for himself and chiefly seeks his own
 " preservation, looks upon the strength and bravery
 " of his Subjects as the root of his greatest danger,
 " and frequently desires to render them weak, base,
 " corrupt, and unfaithful to each other, that they
 " may neither dare to attempt the breaking of the
 " yoke he lays upon them, nor trust one another in
 " any generous design for the recovery of their
 " Liberty. So that the same corruption which pre-
 " serves such a Prince, if it were introduced by a
 " People, would weaken, if not utterly destroy
 " them." *Discourses concerning Government; by AL-*
 GERNON SIDNEY. *ch. 2. Sect. 19.*

Note I. referred to from p. 33.

Making the total number of Patrons only, &c.] I subjoin the passage at large.

“ The Patronage of which your Petitioners complain, is of two kinds; *That* which arises from the unequal distribution of the Elective Franchise, and the popular rights of voting by which certain places return Members to serve in Parliaments; and *that* which arises from the expence attending contested Elections, and the consequent degree of power acquired by wealth.

“ By these two means, a weight of Parliamentary Influence has been obtained by certain individuals, forbidden by the spirit of the Laws, and in its consequences most dangerous to the Liberties of the People of Great Britain.

“ The operation of the *first* species of Patronage is direct, and subject to positive proof. EIGHTY-FOUR individuals do by their own immediate authority send ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY-SEVEN of your Honourable Members to Parliament. And this your Petitioners are ready, if the fact be disputed, to prove, and to name the Members and the Patrons.

“ The *second* species of Patronage cannot be shown with equal accuracy, though it is felt with equal force.

“ Your Petitioners are convinced, that in addition to the one hundred and fifty-seven Honourable Members above mentioned, one hundred and fifty more, making in the whole THREE HUNDRED AND SEVEN,

“ SEVEN, are returned to your Honourable House, not
 “ by the collective voice of those whom they appear to
 “ represent, but by the recommendation of SEVENTY
 “ powerful individuals, added to the EIGHTY-FOUR
 “ before-mentioned, and making the total number of
 “ Patrons altogether ONLY ONE HUNDRED and FIFTY
 “ FOUR, who return a decided majority of your Ho-
 “ nourable House.”—*Authentic Copy of a Petition pray-
 ing for a Reform in Parliament; presented to the House
 of Commons on 6th May, 1793; published by the So-
 ciety, THE FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE, associated for the
 purpose of obtaining a Parliamentary Reform. p. 11. 4to.*

Note K. referred to from p. 34.

*The Lower House, I fear, carries in its prominent
 features too many infallible tendencies toward an oligar-
 chical and standing SENATE.] Mr. BURKE many
 years ago made the same complaint.—“ An ad-
 “ dressing House of Commons, and a petitioning
 “ Nation; an House of Commons full of confidence,
 “ when the Nation is plunged in despair; in the
 “ utmost harmony with Ministers, whom the People
 “ regard with the utmost abhorrence; who vote
 “ Thanks, when the Public Opinion calls upon
 “ them for Impeachments; who are eager to grant,
 “ when the general voice demands account; who, in all
 “ disputes between the People and Administration,
 “ presume against the People; who punish their*

I 2

“ dis-

“ disorders, but refuse even to enquire into the pro-
 “ vocations to them; this is an unnatural, a mon-
 “ strous state of things in this Constitution. Such
 “ an assembly may be a great, wise, awful SENATE;
 “ *but it is not to any popular purpose an House of*
 “ *Commons.* This change from an immediate state
 “ of procuration and delegation to a course of act-
 “ ing as from original power, is the way in which
 “ all the popular magistracies in the world have
 “ been perverted from their purposes.” *Works. v.*
 1. p. 464. Again: “ The constant habit of au-
 “ thority, and the unfrequency of Elections, have
 “ tended very much to draw the House of Com-
 “ mons toward the character of a *standing SENATE.*”
ib. p. 465.—And the *Yorkshire Committee* adopted the
 same distinction.—“ The balance of our Constitu-
 “ tion had been wisely placed by our forefathers in
 “ the hands of the Counties and principal Cities and
 “ Towns; but by the caprice and partiality of our
 “ Kings, from Henry 6th down to Charles 2d, it
 “ was gradually withdrawn from them, and by *the*
 “ *addition of Two Hundred Parliamentary Burgeffes, was*
 “ *wholly vested in the inferior Boroughs.* From that
 “ latter period, the mischiefs of this irregular exer-
 “ cise of royal authority have been farther increased
 “ by the silent operation of time. Many unre-
 “ presented Towns have risen into population,
 “ wealth, and consequence, in the kingdom; many
 “ Boroughs have sunk into indigence, or have even
 “ totally disappeared, without a trace of their exist-
 “ ence left behind them, except the privilege of
 “ nominal

" nominal Representation. In these decayed Bo-
 " roughs, the Crown and a few great Families noto-
 " riously nominate Representatives, who form a clear
 " Majority of the House of Commons. In that Ma-
 " jority a liberal Minister will ever find a ready sup-
 " port, however ruinous the measures of his admi-
 " nistration may be to the Liberty and the general
 " interest of his country. The Members who re-
 " present the great masses of landed and commercial
 " property, shall plead in vain for their Consti-
 " tuents. In the scale of Parliamentary computation,
 " an inconsiderable village will balance a County; and a
 " short list of hamlets, where hardly a vestige of popu-
 " lation is to be found, will decide against the general
 " sense and wishes of the Public. A Parliament elected
 " in any reasonable proportion, would duly represent the
 " sense, and act for the interest of the whole community;
 " but from a SENATE thus unequally arranged, no penal
 " Laws, no external regulations can exclude corruption;
 " because in situations of no control, partial advantage
 " will still outweigh the public good. In royal inno-
 " vation this gross abuse in the Representation of
 " the People chiefly originates. From Parliamen-
 " tary Authority a proper counterpoize, to these
 " dependent Boroughs, must be restored to the
 " Counties and principal Cities, &c. before that
 " Assembly can become once more a firm and in-
 " corruptible guardian of the public weal."—*Ad-
 dress from the Committee of Association of the County of
 York to the Electors of Great Britain: WYVILL'S Po-
 litical Papers, v. 1. p. 310.*

Note L. referred to from p. 38.

The magnitude of this Debt, and the concomitant extent of Taxation—] To aggravate the alarming consequences of our immense Debt, if I had the inclination, would be needless, after the warning of the Commissioners appointed by the Legislature to examine the Public Accounts.—“ It is expedient
 “ (they reported to the House of Commons) that
 “ the true state of the National Debt should be
 “ disclosed to the Public; every subject ought to
 “ know it, for every subject is interested in it. This
 “ Debt is swelled to a magnitude that requires the
 “ united efforts of the ablest heads and purest hearts,
 “ to suggest the proper and effectual means of reduction. The Nation calls for the aid of all its
 “ members to co-operate with Government, and to
 “ combine in carrying into execution such measures
 “ as shall be adopted, for the attainment of so indispensable an end: this aid the subject is bound
 “ to give to the State, by every other obligation,
 “ as well as by the duty he owes to his country; and,
 “ with such general aid, the difficulties, great as
 “ they appear, will, we trust, be found not insurmountable. A plan must be formed for the reduction of this debt, and that without delay; now,
 “ in the favourable moments of Peace. The evil
 “ does not admit of procrastination, *palliatives*, or
 “ *expedients*: it presses on and must be met with force
 “ and firmness. The right of the public creditor
 “ to his Debt, must be preserved inviolate: his security
 “ curity

“curity rests upon the solid foundation, never to be
 “shaken, of Parliamentary national faith.” &c.
 &c. See their *eleventh Report*.

On the extent of our Taxation, I shall extract
 from the works of Mr. ARTHUR YOUNG some cu-
 rious calculations. I have no other wish than that
 they may strike conviction as forcibly on others as
 they do on myself.

“I have so often, in this memoir, mentioned the
 “weight of our Taxes, and there are so many per-
 “sons who consider such things slightly, and with-
 “out applying calculation to them, that I am ap-
 “prehensive lest any reader should imagine, that I
 “deal more in general declamation on the subject,
 “than proceed on the authority of well founded
 “facts. To obviate this idea, and give the best
 “proof I can possibly quote of the justice of my
 “complaints, I will produce that instance with
 “which I am unquestionably well acquainted, name-
 “ly, my own property. I have near a nominal
 “300l. a year here; the following detail of Taxes
 “will show, that it is *but nominal*. I must premise,
 “that I reckon the Tythe, Rates, and Windows of
 “two or three tenants, the same in the account as
 “if paid by myself; for they are in fact as much
 “paid by me, as the sums so assessed on my own
 “farm; of this the proof is sufficiently clear, to
 “those who have tythe free, or extra-parochial
 “farms to let; the rent is exactly proportioned to
 “such circumstances. These burthens fall on a
 “given portion of landed property; it matters no-
 I 4 “thing

" thing by whose hand they are paid ; the proprietor
 " will be sure to feel that all issues from his pocket.

	£.	s.	d.
" Tythe—my own *, -	£.31	0	0
" A Tenant, - - -	10	0	0
" Ditto, - - -	10	0	0
	<hr/>		
" Poor Rates, - - -	33	0	0
	10	0	0
	7	0	0
	3	0	0
	<hr/>		
	53	0	0
" Land Tax, - - -	39	12	0
" Road duty and turnpike, - - -	5	6	0
" Assessed taxes, - - -	18	17	6
	7	7	0
	1	0	0
	0	8	0
	<hr/>		
	27	12	6
" Manor of Bradfield Combust, Castle			
" Guard rent, - - -	0	4	5
" Lands in Bradfield Combust, Castle			
" Guard rent, - - -	0	2	8
" Feudal quit rent, - - -	2	2	7
" Consumption of malt in			
" the family, 6 qrs. at			
" 14s. 6d. a qr. tax, - - -	4	7	0
	<hr/>		
Carry forward	183	7	2

" * Mr. BURKE's expression made me smile, " revenues
 " which taken from no person, are set apart for virtue !"

	£.	s.	d.
Brought forward	183	7	2
" Pay annually to my own			
" labourers 33l. in lieu			
" of beer, which, in the			
" same ratio, is for the			
" tax, - - -	11	19	3
" 36 acres of barley, an-			
" nually ; produce 4 qrs,			
" 144 qrs. pay in malt			
" tax 2l. 18s. an acre ;			
" and if 3 qrs. of this crop			
" (deducting 4 bushels			
" for seed, and 4 more			
" for hogs, poultry, &c.)			
" are brewed into 7½ bar-			
" rels of ale, at 5s. 10d,			
" a barrel duty, it is			
" 2l. 5s. 2½d. per acre,			
" together 5l. 3s. 2½d,			
" per acre ; while the to-			
" tal value of the produce			
" of the eastern counties			
" of the kingdom, does			
" not exceed, at 20s. the			
" sum of 4l. A produce			
" taxed like this, at 125			
" per cent. of the value,			
" must be lessened in the			
" consumption and price			
" greatly : I shall suppose,			

" to

	£.	s.	d.
Brought forward	£. 11	19	3
	183	7	2
“ to avoid all exaggera-			
“ tion, that this deduction			
“ in price, is only 4s. a			
“ qr. on the 3 qrs. per			
“ acre fold, this forms a			
“ tax of	-	-	-
	21	12	0
	33	11	3

“ The sale of wool of my
 “ own flock, amounts to
 “ 30l. a year; the depref-
 “ sion of the price, by
 “ reason of the cruel mo-
 “ nopoly given by our
 “ laws, to the manufac-
 “ turers, has been clearly
 “ proved, in various pas-
 “ sages of this work, to
 “ amount on carding
 “ wool to 10 per cent. of
 “ the value,

	3	0	0

219 18 5

“ N. B. On combing wool it is cent. per cent.

“ Of the numerous duties on consumption, in
 “ the form of Customs, Excises, Stamps, and in-
 “ cidents, I have calculated my payments, but do
 “ not include them in this account, as they are
 “ more

" more connected with income, in general, than
 " with the specified receipt, from a given portion
 " of land; I will, however, remark, in order to
 " instigate others to make similar calculations, which
 " are really curious exhibitions of Taxation, that
 " for my consumption of wine, tea, sugar, candles,
 " soap, insurance against fire, stamps, salt, and
 " coals, I pay the sum of 26l. 4s. 5d. exclusive of
 " the further articles of leather, glass, currants,
 " raisins, spices, drugs, deals, iron, hemp, flax,
 " rum, brandy, printed linen, paper, &c. &c.
 " These would probably raise the sum to 40l.

" But recurring solely to the 219l. 18s. 5d. the
 " amount of the taxes paid by my estate, let me
 " next explain what it pays me as proprietor.

	£.	s.	d.
" Gross rental, - - - -	295	3	0
" Deductions—Land tax, £. 39 12 0			
" Quit rent, - - - -	2	2	7
" Castle Guards, - - - -	0	7	1
" Repairs, on the average			
" of 7 years, - - - -	23	8	9
	<hr/>		
	65	10	5
	<hr/>		
" Nett receipt, - - - -	229	12	7

" Hence it appears, that out of a portion of
 " land which yields the proprietor 229l. 12s. 7d.
 " the public burthens take 219l. 18s. 5d.!!!

" To what region of despotism, monarchical or
 " republican, are we to go, to meet with any thing
 " equal

“ equal to this? And does it not hence appear,
 “ that I have not complained of the cruelty, ine-
 “ quality, and injustice of Taxation in this kingdom,
 “ without sufficient ground; but have justly attri-
 “ buted to their baneful influence, the ruin of all
 “ the little estates in the kingdom?”—*Annals of*
Agriculture. v. 15. p. 186.

Note M. referred to from p. 38.

—*Parliament after Parliament, the ready responsive*
AYE to Ministerial requisitions to take the People's mo-
ney?] A respected Member of the Legislature
ascribes the facility of Parliament to grant money
to the same cause—“ Our not possessing a House of
“ Commons, connected with and dependent on the
“ People; unconnected with and independent of
“ the Crown,” In the same inedited tract, enforcing
the necessity of a Parliamentary Reform, this Gen-
tleman continues pointedly but truly, let “ the Na-
“ tion take a general review of their History since
“ the Revolution, and of their present situation.
“ On that view, let them determine for themselves,
“ whether, in the nature of things, it be possible
“ that, in so short a period, the blood of this
“ country should have been wasted in so many fo-
“ reign wars; such treasures should have been la-
“ vished away, sometimes in the support of inter-
“ ests, in which we had no essential concern, and
“ sometimes in the destruction of interests, which
 “ were

“ were our own, or ought to have been equally
 “ dear to us ; that such a national income as ours
 “ should have been exhausted, such a Debt in-
 “ curred, and such enormous burthens as actually
 “ exist, imposed upon the People of this Island,
 “ and of which the direct Taxes of the State are
 “ only a part ;—if the House of Commons had been
 “ what it ought and professes to be, a true Repre-
 “ sentative of and Fellow Sufferer with the Peo-
 “ ple, an effective controul over the Ministers of
 “ the Executive Power, the faithful Stewards of the
 “ public Purse, and not, what it is, a power iden-
 “ tified with that of the Crown. The virtue, spirit,
 “ and essence of a House of Commons consists in
 “ its being the express image of the feelings of the
 “ Nation. What sympathy, what community of
 “ feeling is there between the hand that pays the
 “ tax, and the hand that receives it ;—between him
 “ whose interest it is that the amount should be
 “ moderate, and him, whose interest it is that the
 “ amount should be exorbitant ?” p. 8.

Note N. referred to from p. 43.

*Perjury, of which Election-Oaths are the main
 source, and Custom-house and Excise-Oaths the tributary
 streams, &c.]* The following passage contains a
 practical example of the lamentable effects arising
 from such debasement of the sanctity of an oath.—

“ An

“ An extraordinary affair happened once at Lowes-
 “ toff, when his friend Mr. Clarke was with him
 “ upon a visit; which, he says, they never forgot.
 “ They went together on board one of the small
 “ trading ships belonging to that town, and there
 “ observed two seamen jointly lifting up a vessel out
 “ of the hold: when another who stood by asked
 “ one of them, who was looking down it, why he
 “ did not turn his face away? upon which he turned
 “ his face away, but continued to assist in lifting as
 “ before. The meaning of which they understood
 “ to be this; that he would be obliged to swear, he
 “ *saw* nothing taken out of the hold, not that he
 “ *took* nothing out of it. This, says Mr. Whiston,
 “ is a seaman’s salvo for such errant perjury; and
 “ *this is the consequence of our multiplying oaths on*
 “ *every trifling occasion.*”—See *Historical Memoirs of*
the Life of Dr. Samuel CLARKE, p. 5. Or the *General*
Biographical Dictionary, under the Article WHISTON.

Note O. referred to from p. 45.

The interference of the Lords of Parliament—to be an
high infringement upon the Liberties and Privileges of
the Commons.] Extract of the Address and Resolu-
tions of the Society of the FRIENDS OF THE PEOPLE.
Freemason’s Tavern, 9th April, 1794.—“ Surely at a
 “ moment when the excellence of the Constitution
 “ is

" is so vigorously maintained, that to propose
 " amendment is looked upon as seditious, its
 " advocates will, at least be as strenuous in de-
 " fence of what they acknowledge to be its esta-
 " blished principles, as they are active in sounding
 " the alarm against whatever they choose to call an
 " innovation. If that spirit of discontent really pre-
 " vails, which high authority so very confidently
 " announces, all good men will be anxious to re-
 " move every plausible ground of complaint; and,
 " above all, the House of Commons will be cautious
 " how they tolerate a violation of the Constitution,
 " which they have themselves specifically defined
 " and reprobated; and to which, by their Votes,
 " they have called the public attention.

' From the year 1701 to the year 1794, the
 ' House of Commons have, at the commencement
 ' of every Session, uniformly passed the following
 ' Resolution: That it is a high infringement upon
 ' the Liberties and privileges of the Commons of
 ' Great Britain, for any Lord of Parliament, or any
 ' Lord Lieutenant of any County, to concern them-
 ' selves in the Elections of Members to serve for the
 ' Commons in Parliament.'

" In their Petition of last year, the Society com-
 " plained of the frequent violation of this excellent
 " Resolution, and brought the question before the
 " House of Commons in these words:" ' Your
 ' Petitioners inform your Honourable House, and
 ' are ready to prove it at your bar, that they have
 ' the most reasonable grounds to suspect that no
 ' less

' less than ONE HUNDRED AND FIFTY of your
 ' Honourable Members owe their Elections intirely
 ' to the interference of Peers; and your Petitioners
 ' are prepared to show by legal evidence that forty
 ' Peers, in defiance of your resolutions, have possessed
 ' themselves of so many Burgage tenures, and ob-
 ' tained such an absolute and uncontrolled command
 ' in very many small Boroughs in the kingdom, as
 ' to be enabled, by their own positive authority,
 ' to return EIGHTY-ONE of your Honourable Mem-
 ' bers.'

" The Society again repeat this in the face of the
 " country; and they earnestly intreat every friend
 " to the Liberties of England, to take into con-
 " sideration the consequences of so alarming a
 " practice.

" As far as depends on them, the Society, with-
 " out hesitation, lead the way to bring the question
 " to issue, and therefore,

" Resolve unanimously:—

" I. That the People have a right to the pure,
 " genuine, and uncorrupted energy of the English
 " Constitution, faithfully administered according to
 " its own acknowledged principles.

" II. That the Commons of Great Britain, in
 " Parliament assembled, have, since the reign of
 " King William III. uniformly, solemnly, and an-
 " nually determined one of those principles to be
 " violated, whenever a Peer interferes in an Elec-
 " tion.

" III. That

“ III. That Peers at this day do interfere in
“ Elections, not only by the exercise of the influ-
“ ence naturally arising from high rank and exten-
“ sive possessions, but *by embarking large portions of*
“ *their wealth in the purchase of Borough-Property,*
“ *notoriously for the purpose of sending Members into the*
“ *House of Commons.*

“ IV. That above *one fourth* of the present House
“ of Commons owe their Seats to the known influ-
“ ence and interference of Peers.

“ V. That this interference has a tendency to
“ destroy those advantages, which are to be derived
“ from preserving the separate branches of the Legi-
“ slature distinct and independent of each other, and
“ to make the House of Commons an engine of the
“ Crown and Nobility, instead of what it ought to
“ be—A CHECK UPON THE KING AND THE LORDS.

“ VI. That the great number of Gentlemen well
“ known to be concerned in Borough-Speculations,
“ who, *by the advice of the Minister, have been created*
“ *Peers,* demands the most serious consideration of
“ every friend to the Constitution of Great Britain.

“ VII. That the People of this Country ought
“ not to be taxed but by the consent of Repre-
“ sentatives chosen by the free Suffrages of the
“ Commons of Great Britain; and that a daring
“ insult is offered to the Constitution of these
“ Realms whenever a Peer attempts to usurp the
“ Nomination of a Member to serve in Parliament.

“ In name, and by order of the society,
“ WM. BRETON, Chairman.”

Note P. referred to from p. 52.

You have graduated a moral barometer to ascertain the various degrees of guilt contracted by the various stages of inebriety.] Here is Mr. PALEY's attempt to determine quality by quantity. " If the privation
" of reason be only partial, the guilt will be of a
" mixt nature. For so much of his self-govern-
" ment, as the drunkard retains, he is as respon-
" sible then, as at any other time. He is entitled
" to no abatement, beyond the strict proportion,
" in which his moral faculties are impaired. Now
" I call the guilt of the crime, if a sober man had
" committed it, the whole guilt. A person in the
" condition we describe, incurs part of this, at the
" instant of perpetration, and by bringing himself
" into this condition, he incurred such a fraction of
" the remaining part, as the danger of this consequence
" was of an integral certainty ! For the sake of illus-
" tration, we are at liberty to suppose, that a man
" loses half his moral faculties by drunkenness ; this
" leaving him but half his responsibility, he incurs,
" when he commits the action, half of the whole
" guilt. We will also suppose that it was known
" before hand, that it was an even chance, or half
" a certainty, that this crime would follow his
" getting drunk. This makes him chargeable with
" half of the remainder ; so that altogether, he is
" responsible for three-fourths of the guilt, which a
" sober man would have incurred by the same
" action.

" I do

“ I do not mean that any real case can be reduced
 “ to numbers ; or the calculation made with arith-
 “ metical precision ; but these are the principles,
 “ and this the rule, by which our general admeasure-
 “ ment of the guilt of such offences, should be
 “ regulated.” p. 319.

Note Q. referred to from p. 54.

—*Great and unconstitutional Influence of the Crown.*]

“ Petition agreed to at the Meeting of the County
 “ of York, held the 30th day of December, 1779,
 “ which having been afterward circulated through
 “ the County, was signed by near *nine thousand*
 “ Freeholders, and presented by Sir George SAVILE
 “ to the House of Commons on the 8th day of
 “ February, 1780.

“ To the Honourable the Commons of Great
 “ Britain in Parliament assembled.

“ The Petition of the Gentlemen, Clergy, and
 “ Freeholders of the County of YORK,

“ Sheweth,

“ That this Nation hath been engaged for several
 “ years in a most expensive and unfortunate War ;
 “ that many of our valuable Colonies have actually
 “ declared themselves independent, have formed a
 “ strict confederacy with France and Spain, the
 “ dangerous and inveterate enemies of Great Britain;

“ that the consequence of these combined mis-
 “ fortunes hath been a large addition to the national
 “ Debt; a heavy accumulation of Taxes; a rapid
 “ decline of the trade, manufactures, and land-rents
 “ of the kingdom.

“ Alarmed at the diminished resources and grow-
 “ ing burthens of this country, and convinced that
 “ rigid frugality is now indispensibly necessary in
 “ every department of the State, your Petitioners
 “ observe with grief, that, notwithstanding the
 “ calamitous and impoverished condition of the
 “ Nation, *much public money has been improvi-*
 “ *dently squandered, and that many individuals enjoy*
 “ *sinecure places, efficient places with exorbitant*
 “ *emoluments, and pensions unmerited by public ser-*
 “ *vice, to a large and still encreasing amount;*
 “ whence the Crown has acquired a GREAT
 “ AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL INFLUENCE, *which, if*
 “ *not checked, may soon prove fatal to the Liberties*
 “ *of this country.*

“ Your Petitioners, conceiving that the true end
 “ of every legitimate Government is not the emolu-
 “ ment of any individual, but the welfare of the
 “ community; and considering that, by the Con-
 “ stitution of this realm, the national purse is en-
 “ trusted in a peculiar manner to the custody of this
 “ Honourable House, beg leave farther to represent,
 “ that until effectual measures be taken to redress
 “ the oppressive grievances herein stated, the grant
 “ of any additional sum of public money, beyond
 “ the produce of the present Taxes, will be injuri-
 “ ous

“ous to the rights and property of the People, and
 “derogatory from the honour and dignity of Par-
 “liament.

“Your petitioners, therefore, appealing to the
 “justice of this Honourable House, do most
 “earnestly request that, before any new burthens
 “are laid upon this country, effectual measures
 “may be taken by this House, to inquire into and
 “correct the gross abuses in the expenditure of
 “public money; to reduce all exorbitant emolu-
 “ments; to rescind and abolish all sinecure places
 “and unmerited pensions; and to appropriate the
 “produce to the necessities of the State in such
 “manner as to the wisdom of Parliament shall seem
 “meet.

“And your petitioners shall ever pray, &c.”

WYVILL's *Political Papers*, v. I. p. 7.

The following Counties presented Petitions nearly
 in the same words :

Middlesex,	Dorset,	Chester,	Devon,
Hants,	Norfolk,	Hertford,	Berks,
Suffex,	Bucks,	Huntingdon,	Nottingham,
Surrey,	Kent,	Cumberland,	Northumberland,
Bedford,	Suffolk,	Effex,	Hereford,
Gloucester,	Cambridge,	Somerfet,	Derby,
Wilts.			

Also the Cities of London, Westminster, York,
 Bristol, and the Towns of Cambridge, Nottingham,
 Newcastle, Reading, and Bridgewater.—The County
 of Northampton agreed to instruct their Members
 on the points of the Petition.

" Die Veneris, Aprilis 14mo. 1780.

" Moved,

" That the Bill, intituled a Bill for the exclusion
" of Contractors from the lower House of Parlia-
" ment, be read a second time and committed.

" After some debate, the question being put,
" there appeared

" For the commitment — 41

" Against it — — 60

" Majority — 19

" It was then moved to reject the Bill.

" The question was put thereupon, and resolved
" in the affirmative.

" Dissentient,

" I. Because the Commons, desirous of re-esta-
" blishing the reputation and authority of Parlia-
" ment, and of giving satisfaction to the People,
" at a time when the most cordial and unsuspicious
" confidence between the representative and consti-
" tuent bodies is essentially necessary, have come to
" a Resolution, ' That it is necessary to declare,
" that the Influence of the Crown has increased, is
" increasing, and ought to be diminished.'

" This Resolution we conceive to be undeniably
" true, and highly seasonable. Their commence-
" ment of the diminution (which they have solemnly
" engaged to make) by their Bill here rejected, is
" no less judicious. In the midst of a War, in
" which nothing (among all its unhappy circum-
" stances) is more remarkable than the prodigality
" with

“ with which it is carried on, it appears peculiarly
 “ necessary to remove from Parliament the suspicion
 “ that the rash adoption, the obstinate continuance,
 “ and the corrupt supply of military arrangements,
 “ are connected with the support of a court majority
 “ in Parliament.

“ II. Because *the People, oppressed with actual im-*
 “ *positions, and terrified with the certain prospect of*
 “ *farther and heavier burthens, have a right to be*
 “ *assured, that none should have a power of laying those*
 “ *burthens, who have an interest in increasing them.*
 “ *Neither is it fit that they who are the principal sub-*
 “ *jects of complaint, should sit as the controllers of their*
 “ *own conduct.* Contracts can never be fairly made,
 “ when the Parliamentary service of the Con-
 “ tractor is a necessary, understood part of the
 “ agreement, and must be reckoned into the price.
 “ But the most unexceptionable Contract being a
 “ matter of great advantage to the Contractor, it
 “ becomes a means of Influence even when it is not
 “ a principle of abuse. It is the greatest of all the
 “ bribes a Minister has to bestow; and one day's
 “ job^b may be worth the purchase of the fee of most
 “ of the Places and Pensions that are held in that
 “ House.

“ III. Because no reasons have been assigned for
 “ the rejection of this Bill, but such as appear to
 “ us frivolous or dangerous. It was argued as
 “ necessary to abate the phrenzy of virtue, which
 “ began to show itself in the House of Commons.
 “ This new species of phrenzy we look upon to be

“ rather a character of soundness, than a symptom
 “ of insanity; and we fairly declare, that, as we
 “ frequently come into contact with the other
 “ House, we heartily wish that that distemper may
 “ become contagious. Another reason assigned
 “ against this Bill, *that it is not possible for vast*
 “ *pecuniary emoluments to have any Influence on Mem-*
 “ *bers of Parliament, appears to originate from so per-*
 “ *fect a puerility of understanding, or such a contempt*
 “ *of that of the House and the Nation, that it is men-*
 “ *tioned as a matter to be animadverted upon, not*
 “ *answered.* Of the same nature is the argument
 “ drawn from the supposed improbability of abuses
 “ in contracts, because the Law has left in the hands
 “ of the Ministers the means of prosecuting at law
 “ the supporters of their power, and the accomplices
 “ of their own fraud and malversation. These argu-
 “ ments will give little satisfaction to those who look
 “ at the House of Lords as a barrier against some
 “ possibly sudden and mistaken warmth of the House
 “ of Commons, that might be injurious to the just
 “ Prerogatives of the Crown, or the Rights of the
 “ People; but we will not bear the gross abuse of
 “ this constitutional power; or that this House
 “ should set itself as an obstruction to the most
 “ honourable, manly, and virtuous Resolution, ever
 “ come to by an House of Commons; a resolution
 “ made in direct conformity to the Petitions of their
 “ Constituents. *We protest, therefore, against our*
 “ *standing in the way of even the first steps taken toward*
 “ *promoting*

" *promoting the independence, integrity, and virtue of a*
 " *House of Parliament.*

" De Ferrars,	J. St. Asaph,
" Rockingham,	Beaulieu,
" Abergavenny,	Osborne,
" Fortescue,	Cholmondeley,
" Courtenay,	Manchester,
" Wycombe,	Coventry,
" Ponsonby,	St. John,
" Percy,	Fitz-William,
" Ferrers,	Abingdon,
" Pembroke, and	Portland,
" Montgomery,	Devonshire,
" Scarborough,	Harcourt,
" Richmond,	Jersey.

" For the first and third reasons, adopting how-
 " ever very heartily in the present state of Parlia-
 " mentary Representation the sound principles con-
 " tained in the second, which yet I conceive inap-
 " plicable to this Bill.

" Radnor."

Note R. referred to from p. 62.

—*scandalous practices acquired in the Court of the*
despot, where he spent his early life.] CLARENDON re-
 lates and laments this bias. On the introduction of a
 French custom at the Coronation of Charles he ob-
 serves—" They liked it the worse, because they
 " discerned

“ discerned that it issued from a fountain, from
 “ whence many bitter waters were like to flow, the
 “ customs of the Court of France, whereof the King
 “ and the Duke had too much the image in their heads,
 “ and than which there could not be a copy more
 “ universally ingrateful and odious to the English
 “ Nation.” *Life of Clarendon, by himself, v. 1.*
*p. 367. 8vo. 1760—*And again: “ Not only the
 “ Duke, but the King himself, had a marvellous
 “ prejudice to the Nation [the English] in that part
 “ of good manners: And it was easily agreed that
 “ the model of France, was in those, and other cases,
 “ much more preferable, and which was afterward ob-
 “ served in too many.” *ib. v. 2. p. 76.—*Add to
 these—“ After the Restoration, England adopted the
 “ modes of France, her worst modes. There were
 “ some, too many, who, unworthy of their own
 “ happiness and Liberty, came to admire her Go-
 “ vernment and misfortune; and laboured with the
 “ spirit of Parricides, though without their punish-
 “ ment, to bring ours to the model of that.” *The*
works of Tacitus, with political Discourses, by T.
GORDON, v. 4. p. 210. 4th edit.

“ The French greatness never, during his whole
 “ reign, inspired Charles with any apprehensions;
 “ and CLIFFORD, it is said, one of his most fa-
 “ voured Ministers, went so far as to affirm that it
 “ were better for the King to be Viceroy under a great
 “ and generous Monarch, than a slave to five hundred
 “ of his own insolent subjects!” *HUME; Hist. of Eng-*
land. v. 8. p. 203. 8vo.

Note S. referred to from p. 64.

Not to multiply authorities—] Left I should too much encumber the text with quotations, I forbore to insert any more than the opinions of CLARENDON, BOLINGBROKE, and BURKE. Here, to confront the “ *many wise and virtuous politicians who (as Mr. PALEY tells us) deem a considerable portion of Influence to be a necessary part of the British Constitution* ”—p. 491. but whose names he gives not, I must add the concordant authorities of Lord LYTTLETON, Judge BLACKSTONE, Sir William JONES, and Bishop WATSON.—“ I shall only add to what I have said, that, “ unless something be done by this Parliament, to “ give new vigour to our Liberties, stop the torrent “ of Corruption, and revive the principles and the “ spirit of our fathers, we have less to hope than to “ apprehend from those to come. The time, I doubt, is “ not far off, when by the increase of Influence, “ there may be such difficulties upon country Gentle- “ men to oppose the Court in Elections, and such “ a despondency, such a dispiritedness on the minds “ of all, except the favourites of power, that no “ struggle could be expected, no opposition at all, “ to the nomination of the Crown. A kind of *congé* “ *d’elire* might be sent down into the country, and “ directed to our trusty and well-beloved officers of “ the Customs, Excise, and Army, in all the Towns “ and Boroughs of England, Scotland, Wales, and “ the

“ the Duchy of Cornwall. Suitable returns would
 “ be made : but, Sir, *this would not be a Parliament.*”

LYTTLETON ; *Works by Ayscough*, v. 1. p. 107.

“ With regard to power, we may find perhaps that
 “ the hands of Government are at least sufficiently
 “ strengthened ; and that an English monarch is now
 “ in no danger of being overborne by either the
 “ Nobility or the People. The instruments of
 “ Power are not perhaps so open and avowed as
 “ they formerly were, and therefore are the less
 “ liable to jealous and invidious reflections ; but they
 “ are not the weaker upon that account. In short,
 “ our national Debt and Taxes (besides the incon-
 “ veniences before-mentioned) have also in their
 “ natural consequences thrown such a weight of
 “ power into the executive scale of Government, as
 “ we cannot think was intended by our patriot an-
 “ cestors ; who gloriously struggled for the abolition
 “ of the then formidable parts of the Prerogative ;
 “ and by an unaccountable want of foresight esta-
 “ blished this system in their stead. The entire
 “ collection and management of so vast a Revenue,
 “ being placed in the hands of the Crown, have
 “ given rise to such a multitude of new officers,
 “ created by and removeable at the royal pleasure,
 “ that they have extended the Influence of Govern-
 “ ment to every corner of the nation. Witness the
 “ Commissioners, and the multitude of the de-
 “ pendents on the Customs, in every port of the
 “ kingdom ; the Commissioners of Excise, and their
 “ numerous

“ numerous subalterns, in every inland district; the
 “ Postmasters and their servants, planted in every
 “ town, and upon every public road; the Com-
 “ missioners of the Stamps, and their distributors
 “ which are full as scattered and full as numerous;
 “ the officers of the salt duty, which, though a spe-
 “ cies of Excise, and conducted in the same manner,
 “ are yet made a distinct corps from the ordinary
 “ managers of that revenue; the surveyors of houses
 “ and windows; the receivers of the land tax; the
 “ managers of Lotteries, and the Commissioners of
 “ hackney coaches; all which are either mediately
 “ or immediately appointed by the Crown, and re-
 “ moveable at pleasure, without any reason assigned:
 “ these, it requires but little penetration to see, must
 “ give that power, on which they depend for sub-
 “ sistance, an Influence most amazingly extensive.
 “ To this may be added the frequent opportunities
 “ of conferring particular obligations, *by preference in*
 “ *Loans, Subscriptions, Tickets, remittances, and other*
 “ *money-transactions, which will greatly increase this*
 “ *Influence; and that over those persons whose attach-*
 “ *ment, on account of their wealth, is frequently the most*
 “ *desirable.* All this is the natural, though perhaps
 “ the unforeseen, consequence of erecting our Funds
 “ of credit, and to support them establishing our pre-
 “ sent perpetual Taxes: the whole of which is entirely
 “ new since the Restoration in 1660; and by far the
 “ greatest part since the Revolution in 1688. And
 “ the same may be said with regard to the officers
 “ in our numerous Army, and the places which the
 “ Army

“ Army has created. All which put together, give
 “ the executive power so persuasive an energy with
 “ respect to the persons themselves, and so pre-
 “ vailing an interest with their friends and families,
 “ as will amply make amends for the loss of ex-
 “ ternal prerogative.” BLACKSTONE; *Comment.*
b. 1. ch. 8.

“ Return a conciliating Parliament, and restore
 “ the lost balance of your Constitution. I said the
 “ *lost* balance, and I said it with boldness; because
 “ it is a proposition of the clearest evidence, a truth
 “ of the first water, that the due temperature of
 “ powers in our mixed system, which MONTESQUIEU,
 “ who breathed the spirit of an Englishman, and
 “ BLACKSTONE, who was the pride of England, so
 “ lavishly applauded, subsists no more.

“ The subject, on which I am entering, is vast,
 “ but I will restrain myself within proper bounds,
 “ and be satisfied with reminding you, that the exe-
 “ cutive Magistrate (of whom it behoves us to
 “ speak respectfully, yet freely) has of late acquired
 “ two enormous branches, not of just prerogative,
 “ but of unconstitutional power: *Influence*, by re-
 “ ceiving and dispensing at pleasure all the gold, and
 “ force, by commanding and subjecting to his nod
 “ all the steel, of the Nation, thus holding in his
 “ mighty grasp, as the Thunderer of the ancients is
 “ represented on Olympus, the two sinews of war;
 “ by one of which the coequal parts of the Legisla-
 “ ture may continually be sapped, and by the other

“ may at any time be stormed. I have heard undue
 “ Prerogative compared to a giant, who bestrides
 “ our narrow island, and may at his discretion
 “ suspend his massy club over our heads, or reduce
 “ us to powder with its weight ; while Influence re-
 “ sembles a fairy, who plays around us invisibly, or
 “ assumes any shape that suits her purpose, and
 “ often drops *gold or patents* in proper places, as a
 “ reward or incentive for such as merit the approba-
 “ tion of the little wanton divinity. Attempts to
 “ bring back the Constitution to its genuine tem-
 “ perament are so far from being seditious, or even
 “ derogatory from the respect due to the Crown,
 “ that they would, if successful, highly augment the
 “ splendour of it ; unless it be more glorious to
 “ rule, like the princes of the continent, over slaves,
 “ than to be the chief in a Nation of Freemen ; an
 “ opinion, which no man, who deserves either dig-
 “ nity or freedom, can entertain.” *Speech by Sir W.*

JONES, in 1780. p. 53.

“ For my own part, and I verily believe I am far
 “ from being singular in my notions, I take this op-
 “ portunity of publicly declaring to your Grace,
 “ what I have a thousand times before declared to
 “ my friends in private, that I never entertained the
 “ most distant desire, of seeing either the Demo-
 “ cratical, or the Aristocratical scale of the Consti-
 “ tution, outweigh the Monarchical ; not one jot of
 “ the legal Prerogative did I ever wish to see abo-
 “ lished ; not one tittle of the King’s Influence in
 “ the

“ the State to be destroyed, except so far as it was
 “ extended over the deliberations of the Hereditary
 “ Counsellors of the Crown, or the Parliamentary
 “ Representatives of the People. I own I have
 “ wished, and I own (with a heart as loyal as the
 “ loyalest) that I shall continue to wish, that an In-
 “ fluence of this kind may be diminished ; because
 “ I firmly believe that its diminution will, eventually
 “ tend to the conservation of the genuine Consti-
 “ tution of our country ; to the honour of his Ma-
 “ jesty’s Government ; to the stability of the
 “ Hanover succession ; and to the promotion of the
 “ public good. Had the Influence here spoken of
 “ been less predominant of late years ; had the
 “ measures of the Cabinet been canvassed by the
 “ wisdom, and tempered by the moderation of men
 “ exercising their free powers of deliberation for the
 “ common weal, the brightest jewel of his Ma-
 “ jesty’s crown had not now been tarnished ; the
 “ strongest limb of the British Empire had not now
 “ been rudely severed from its parent stock. I
 “ make not this remark with a view of criminating
 “ any set of Ministers, (for the best may be mistaken
 “ in their judgments, and errors which are past
 “ should be forgotten, buried in the zeal of all
 “ parties to rectify the mischiefs they have occa-
 “ sioned) but simply to show, by a recent example,
 “ that the Influence of the Crown when exerted by
 “ the Cabinet, over the Public Counsellors of the
 “ King, is a circumstance so far from being to be
 “ wished by his true friends, that it is as dangerous
 “ to

“ to the real interests and honour of the Crown
 “ itself, as it is odious to the People, and destructive
 “ of public Liberty ; it may contribute to keep a
 “ prime Minister in his place contrary to the sense
 “ of the wisest and best part of the community ; it
 “ may contribute to keep the King himself un-
 “ acquainted with his People’s wishes, but it cannot
 “ do the King or the State any service. *To maintain*
 “ *the contrary is to satyrize his Majesty’s Government,*
 “ *it is to insinuate that his views and interests are*
 “ *so disjoined from those of his People, that they cannot be*
 “ *effected by the uninfluenced concurrence of honest*
 “ *men.* It is far beneath the character of a great and
 “ upright Monarch, to be suspected of a desire to
 “ carry any plans of Government into execution in
 “ opposition to the sentiments of a free and en-
 “ lightened Parliament ; and the Minister who
 “ should be base enough to advise him to adopt
 “ such an arbitrary system of Government, or should
 “ supply the corrupted means of carrying it on,
 “ would deserve the execration of every man of in-
 “ tegrity, and would, probably, sooner or later, meet
 “ with the deserved detestation of the Prince him-
 “ self. It is of such men as these—there is no
 “ impropriety, I hope, in borrowing truth from tra-
 “ gedy, since Chrysoctom is said to have slept with
 “ even an Aristophanes under his pillow ; it is of
 “ such men as these the poet speaks,

“ It is the curse of Kings to be attended
 “ By slaves that take their humour for a warrant ;
 “ And who, to be endeared to a King,
 “ Make no conscience to destroy his honour.

“ In a word, if there be any one measure more
 “ likely than another to preserve pure and un-
 “ blemished the honour of the Crown ; to secure its
 “ most valuable rights ; to procure for it warm,
 “ bold, determined friends, who in the hour of dan-
 “ ger would support it at the hazard of their lives
 “ against foreign or domestic insult ; I verily believe
 “ it to be, the establishing, as much as possible, *the*
 “ *independency of the several Members of both Houses of*
 “ *Parliament.*” WATSON’S *Sermons and Tracts.*
 p. 407. 1788.

Note T. referred to from p. 67.

Sometimes was mortified by sudden expostulation, not to say rude remonstrance.] To take one instance.

“ My Lords and Gentlemen,

“ I have a full assurance of the good affections of
 “ my People ; which I shall endeavour to preserve,
 “ by a constant care of their just Rights and Li-
 “ berties ; by maintaining the established Religion ;
 “ by seeing the course of Justice kept steady and
 “ equal ; by countenancing virtue, and discouraging
 “ vice ; and by declining no difficulties nor dangers,
 “ where their welfare and prosperity may be con-
 “ cerned. These are my resolutions ; and I am
 “ persuaded that you are come together with pur-
 “ poses, on your part, suitable to these of mine.
 “ Since, then, our aims are only for the general
 “ good, let us act with confidence in one another ;
 “ which

“ which will not fail by God’s blessing to make
 “ me a happy King, and you a happy, flourishing
 “ People.”

“ This excellent speech was so far from removing
 “ (as it was hoped) the ill impressions, which the
 “ dissatisfaction the King had expressed upon the
 “ proceedings of the Commons, when he parted
 “ with them last, had left in their minds, that it
 “ served rather to increase them. The Commons,
 “ notwithstanding their disbanding the forces, would
 “ not suffer the least intimation of their want of con-
 “ fidence in the King; and grew angry at their
 “ being thought to have given any occasion to such
 “ a suspicion: Instead, therefore, of an address of
 “ thanks, they presented a sort of remonstrance,
 “ setting forth; “ That, being highly sensible that
 “ there was nothing more necessary for the peace
 “ and prosperity of the kingdom, for the quieting
 “ People’s minds, and disappointing his enemies
 “ designs, than a mutual and entire confidence be-
 “ tween him and his Parliament; they did esteem
 “ it their greatest misfortune, that, after having so
 “ amply provided for his and the Government’s se-
 “ curity, both by sea and land, any jealousy or mis-
 “ trust had been raised of their duty and affection to
 “ him and his People: And beg leave to represent
 “ to him, that it would greatly conduce to the con-
 “ tinuing and establishing an entire confidence be-
 “ tween him and them, that he would show marks
 “ of his high displeasure toward all, that should pre-
 “ sume to misrepresent their proceedings to him;

“ and they, on their part, being duly sensible of
 “ his constant concern to maintain their civil and
 “ religious Rights, in defence whereof he had so
 “ often exposed his person, would do all they could
 “ to prevent and discourage all false rumours and
 “ reports, reflecting on his Majesty’s Government,
 “ whereby to create any misunderstanding between
 “ him and his subjects.” *Hist. of England; continua-*
tion of RAPIN by TINDAL, v. 4. p. 256. fol.

Note U. referred to from p. 69.

—*from the Statute of Talliage to the Speeches of*
CAMDEN against American Taxation—]

“ My searches have more and more convinced
 “ me, that the British Parliament have no right to
 “ tax the Americans. I shall not, therefore, con-
 “ sider the declaratory Bill now lying on your table;
 “ for to what purpose, but loss of time, to consider
 “ the particulars of a Bill the very existence of
 “ which is illegal, absolutely illegal, contrary to the
 “ fundamental laws of Nature, contrary to the
 “ fundamental laws of this Constitution? A Con-
 “ stitution grounded on the eternal and immutable
 “ laws of Nature; a Constitution whose foundation
 “ and centre is Liberty, which sends Liberty to
 “ every subject that is, or may happen to be within
 “ any part of its ample circumference. Nor, my
 “ Lords, is the doctrine new; ’tis as old as the
 “ Con-

" Constitution ; it grew up with it ; indeed it is its
 " support ; *Taxation and Representation are inse-*
 " *parably united* ; God hath joined them, no Bri-
 " tish Parliament can separate them ; to endeavour
 " to do it is to stab our very vitals. Nor is this
 " the first time this doctrine has been mentioned ;
 " seventy years ago, my Lords, a pamphlet was
 " published recommending the levying a Parlia-
 " mentary Tax on one of the Colonies ; this pam-
 " phlet was answered by two others, then much
 " read ; these totally deny the power of taxing the
 " Colonies ; and why ? because the Colonies had no
 " Representatives in Parliament to give consent ; no
 " answer, public or private, was given to these
 " pamphlets, no censure passed upon them ; men
 " were not startled at the doctrine, as either new or
 " illegal, or derogatory to the rights of Parliament.
 " I do not mention these pamphlets by way of au-
 " thority, but to vindicate myself from the imputa-
 " tion of having first broached this doctrine.

" My position is this—I repeat it—I will main-
 " tain it to my last hour,—*Taxation and Representa-*
 " *tion are inseparable* ; this position is founded on the
 " laws of Nature ; for whatever is a man's own is
 " absolutely his own ; no man has a right to take it
 " from him without his consent, either expressed by
 " himself or Representative ; whoever attempts to
 " do it attempts an injury ; *whoever does it, commits*
 " *a robbery* ; he throws down and destroys the dis-
 " tinction between Liberty and slavery. *Taxation*
 " *and Representation are coeval with and essential to*
 " this

" *this Constitution.* I wish the maxim of MACHIA-
 " VEL was followed, that of examining a Constitu-
 " tion at certain periods, according to its first prin-
 " ciples; this would *correct abuses, and supply de-*
 " *fects.* I wish the times would bear it, and that
 " men's minds were cool enough to enter upon such
 " a task, and *that the representative authority of this*
 " *kingdom was more equally settled.*" Lord CAMDEN'S
Speech against the Bill declaratory of the Sovereignty of
Great Britain over the Colonies, in 1766.

Note W. referred to from p. 76.

*In turning over the leaves of your production we per-
 petually recal the sentiments of former writers, fre-
 quently copied literally, and always without acknow-
 legement.]* Take these as a specimen.

LOCKE had said:

" We may, I think from the
 " make of *an Oyster or Cockle,*
 " reasonably conclude that it
 " has not so many, nor so quick
 " senses, as a Man, or several
 " other Animals; nor if it
 " had, would it in that state,
 " and incapacity of transfer-
 " ring itself from one place to
 " another, be bettered by them.
 " I cannot but think, there is
 " some small dull perception,
 " whereby they are distin-
 " guished

And Mr. PALEY says:

" When we are in perfect
 " health and spirits, we feel in
 " ourselves a happiness inde-
 " pendent of any particular
 " outward gratification what-
 " ever, and of which we can
 " give no account. This is an
 " enjoyment which the Deity
 " has annexed to life; and
 " probably constitutes, in a
 " great measure, the happiness
 " of infants and brutes, espe-
 " cially of the lower and se-
 " dentary

" guished from perfect insensi-
 " bility. And that this may
 " be so, we have plain in-
 " stances, even in mankind it-
 " self. Take one in whom
 " decrepid old age has blotted
 " out the memory of his
 " past knowlege, and clearly
 " wiped out the Ideas his mind
 " was formerly stored with;
 " &c. How far such an one
 " (notwithstanding all that is
 " boasted of Innate Princi-
 " ples) is in his knowledge and
 " intellectual faculties above
 " the condition of a *Cockle* or
 " an *Oyster*, I leave to be con-
 " sidered." *An Essay concern-*
ing Human Understanding, b.
2. ch. 9. v. 1. p. 109. of 8th
edit. 8vo. 1721.

LOCKE had said :

" That men should keep
 " their compacts, is certainly
 " a great and undeniable rule
 " in Morality : But yet, if a
 " Christian, who has the view
 " of Happiness and Misery in
 " another life, be asked why
 " a Man must keep his word,
 " he will give this as a reason :
 " Because God, who has the
 " power of eternal Life and
 " Death, requires it of us.
 " But if an Hobbist be asked
 " why,

" dentary orders of animals,
 " as *oysters, periwinkles*, and the
 " like ; for which I have some-
 " times been at a loss to find
 " amusement." *b. 1. ch. 6. p.*
33, of 1st edit.

And Mr. PALEY says :

" Why am I obliged to keep
 " my word? Because it is
 " right, says one.—Because it
 " is agreeable to the Fitness
 " of Things, says another.—
 " Because it is conformable to
 " Reason and Nature, says a
 " third.—Because it is con-
 " formable to Truth, says a
 " fourth.—Because it promotes
 " the Public Good, says a
 " fifth.—Because it is required
 " by the Will of God, con-
 " cludes,

" why, he will answer, because
 " the Public requires it, and
 " the Leviathan will punish
 " you if you do not. And if
 " one of the old Heathen Phi-
 " losophers had been asked,
 " he would have answered,
 " because it was dishonest, be-
 " low the dignity of a Man,
 " and opposite to Virtue, the
 " highest perfection of human
 " Nature, to do otherwise."

*ib. b. 1. ch. 3. p. 32 of same vol.
 of same edit.*

" cludes a sixth," *b. 2. ch. 1.
 p. 47. of same edit.*

BLACKSTONE of Marriage.

" The Civil Law required
 " the consent of the Parent or
 " Tutor at all ages; unless
 " the children were emanci-
 " pated, or out of the Parents
 " power.—These provisions
 " are adopted and imitated by
 " the French and Hollanders,
 " with this difference: that
 " in France the Sons cannot
 " marry without consent of
 " Parents till thirty years of
 " age, nor the Daughters till
 " twenty-five; and in Holland,
 " the Sons are at their own
 " disposal at twenty-five, and
 " the Daughters at twenty.
 " Thus hath stood, and thus
 " at present stands, the Law
 " in other neighbouring coun-
 " tries.

MR. PALEY of Marriage.

" A late regulation in the
 " law of Marriages in this
 " Country, has made the con-
 " sent of the Father, if he be
 " living, of the Mother, if she
 " survive the Father, or of
 " Guardians, if both Parents
 " be dead, necessary to the
 " Marriage of a person under
 " twenty-one years of age. By
 " the Roman Law, the consent
 " *et avi et patris* was required
 " so long as they lived. In
 " France the consent of Pa-
 " rents is necessary to the Mar-
 " riage of Sons, until they at-
 " tain to thirty years of age;
 " of Daughters, until twenty-
 " five. In Holland for Sons,
 " till twenty-five; for Daugh-
 " ters

" tries. And it has lately been
 " thought proper to introduce
 " somewhat of the same policy
 " into our Laws, by Statute
 " 26 Geo. 2nd. c. 33. where-
 " by it is enacted, that all
 " Marriages celebrated by Li-
 " cence, where either of the
 " parties is under twenty-one,
 " without the consent of the
 " Father, or, if he be not liv-
 " ing, of the Mother, or
 " Guardians, shall be abso-
 " lutely void." *Commentaries*
on the Laws of England, b. 1.
ch. 15. v. 1. p. 437. of 5th edit.
8vo. 1773.

" ters till twenty." *b. 3. part*
3. ch. 8. p. 281, of 1st edit.

Note X. referred to from p. 88.

Like MANDEVILLE you would qualify your system
by setting bounds to the practice.] Where I write, I
 have not the *Fable of the Bees* at hand. But we
 may safely rely on the representation of WARBUR-
 TON. Of this preacher of a new Morality (for
 MANDEVILLE called his book "a system of most
 " exalted Morals") that learned Prelate indignantly
 observes "though his general position be, that pri-
 " vate vices are public benefits, yet, in his proof of
 " it, he all along explains it by vice only in a certain
 " measure, and to a certain degree." *Divine Legation*
of Moses demonstrated. b. 1. f. 6.

Note Y. referred to from p. 91.

“ *The Army must have its pay, and the Public Creditors their interest.*”]

“ They [the House of Commons] possess a pretended power of with-holding Supplies. But the situation of society has in truth wrested it from them. The Supplies they must vote, for the Army must have its pay, and the Public Creditors their interest. A power that cannot be exercised without provoking mutiny, and proclaiming bankruptcy, the blindest bigot cannot deny to be purely nominal.” *Vindiciæ Gallicæ*; by James MACKINTOSH, Esq. p. 335. 2nd. edit.

So JUNIUS.

“ As to the refusal of Supplies, we might punish ourselves indeed, but it would be no way compulsory upon the King. With respect to his Civil List, he is already independent, or might be so, if he had common sense, or common resolution; and as for refusing to vote the Army or Navy, I hope we shall never be mad enough to try an experiment every way so hazardous.” *Last Letter.*

Note Z. referred to from p. 98.

The Sicilians insulted with the solemn grimace of a Parliament:] As I learn from a modern traveller.

“ The

“ The foundation of the Feudal System was first
 “ laid here by the count Rugeiro, about the middle
 “ of the eleventh century, immediately after he had
 “ driven the Saracens out of the Island. He di-
 “ vided Sicily into three parts; the first, by con-
 “ sent of his army, was given to the church; the
 “ second he bestowed upon his officers, and the
 “ third he reserved for himself.

“ Of these three branches, or as they call them
 “ *Braccios*, (arms) he composed his *Parliament*, the
 “ *form of which remains exactly the same to this day*.
 “ The *Braccio Militare* is composed of all the ba-
 “ rons of the kingdom to the number of two hun-
 “ dred and fifty-one, who are still obliged to mili-
 “ tary service: their chief is the prince Butero, who
 “ is hereditary president of the Parliament; for in
 “ conformity to the genius of the feudal govern-
 “ ment some of the great offices are still hereditary.
 “ The three archbishops, all the bishops, abbeyes,
 “ priors, and dignified clergy, amounting to near
 “ seventy, form the *Braccio Ecclesiastico*. The arch-
 “ bishop of Palermo is their chief. The *Braccio*
 “ *Demaniale* is formed by Election, like our House
 “ of Commons: there are forty-three royal cities,
 “ stiled *Demaniale*, that have a right to elect mem-
 “ bers. *Every Householder had a vote in this Election*.
 “ Their chief is the Member for Palermo; who is
 “ likewise prætor (or mayor of the city). He is
 “ an officer of the highest rank, and his power is
 “ very extensive, inferior only to that of the Vice-
 “ roy; in whose absence the greatest part of the
 “ authority

“ authority devolves upon him. He has a company
 “ of grenadiers for his body guards; and receives
 “ the title of excellency.

“ The prætor, together with his senators, who
 “ are stiled patricians, have the entire management
 “ of the civil government of the city. He is ap-
 “ pointed every year by the king, or by the vice-
 “ roy, which is the same thing; for I don't find
 “ that the People any longer exercise even the form
 “ of giving their votes. So that the very shadow
 “ of Liberty has now disappeared as well as the
 “ substance. You may judge of the situation of
 “ Liberty in a kingdom, where all courts, civil and
 “ criminal, are appointed by regal authority, and
 “ where all offices are conferred only by the will of
 “ the Sovereign, and depend entirely upon his ca-
 “ price.” *A Tour through Sicily and Malta; by P.*
BRYDONE, F.R.S. v. 2. p. 226. 1773.

THE END.

